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Judicial Authority Under the First Step Act:
What Congress Conferred Through Section 404
Sarah E. Ryan*
The First Step Act of 2018 promised relief to inmates serving
disproportionately long sentences for cocaine base distribution. Section 404,
the focus of this Article, seemed straightforward. But in the spring and
summer of 2019, district judges began reviewing section 404 cases and
reaching dissonant results. Appeals followed, focused on four questions of
judicial authority: (1) Who may judges resentence?, (2) May judges engage
in plenary resentencing or merely sentence reduction?, (3) May judges
resentence all concurrent criminal convictions or only crack cocaine
convictions?, and (4) Must judges adopt the operative drug quantity from
the original sentencing? Today, the law of section 404 remains incomplete
in every circuit. This Article reviews the legislative history, text, and legal
context of section 404. It finds that Congress intended broad judicial
authority in section 404 resentencings.
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INTRODUCTION
After twenty years of private practice, attorney Robert Jonker was
nominated for federal judicial service.1 He was commissioned to the
federal district court for the Western District of Michigan on July 16,
2007.2 Less than two years later, Judge Jonker sentenced Walter
Boulding to life in prison for selling cocaine base, or “crack.”3 The new
judge felt that the sentence was too harsh,4 but Congress had left him with
no choice. Mr. Boulding “had been convicted of two prior felony drug
offenses, subjecting him to a mandatory minimum term of life
imprisonment.”5 So, the judge ordered the twenty-nine-year-old to spend
his life behind bars.6
In 2019, Judge Jonker resentenced Mr. Boulding under the First Step
Act of 2018.7 The judge considered the sizeable drug quantities and
weapons involved as well as Mr. Boulding’s leadership role in the drug
distribution ring and threats of violence.8 Still, the judge reduced Mr.
Boulding’s term of imprisonment.9 That sentence reduction is
controversial. Some judges have found that the First Step Act does not
extend to defendants with comparable criminal conduct.10 This Article
argues that the First Step Act authorized Judge Jonker to reduce Mr.
1. Jonker, Robert James, FED. JUD. CTR., https://www.fjc.gov/node/1392596
[https://perma.cc/UH3Y-D2VK] (last visited Sept. 10, 2020).
2. Id.
3. Transcript of Sent’g Hearing at 3, 25, United States v. Boulding, No. 1:08-cr-65-01 (W.D.
Mich. filed May 13, 2009).
4. Id. at 3 (“You know, and in the Boulding case, in some senses with the congressional mandate
of mandatory life in this situation, in some sense it’s an easy sentencing hearing. . . . On the other
hand, in the more fundamental way, it’s a very difficult sentencing hearing for me, because life in
prison is not the sentence I would impose on Mr. Boulding if I had the full discretion that I normally
have in sentencing.”).
5. United States v. Boulding, 412 F. App’x 798, 801 (6th Cir. 2011); see also Verdict Form,
Boulding, No. 1:08-cr-65-01.
6. See United States v. Boulding, 379 F. Supp. 3d 646, 648 (W.D. Mich. 2019) (“He was 29
years old at the time.”).
7. Id.; First Step Act of 2018, Pub. L. No. 115-391, § 404(b), 132 Stat. 5194, 5222 (2018).
8. Boulding, 379 F. Supp. 3d at 657.
9. Id.
10. E.g., United States v. Blocker, 378 F. Supp. 3d 1125, 1128–29 (N.D. Fla. 2019) (declining
to resentence defendant who admitted to conspiracy activity involving 500 grams of powder cocaine, much of which was converted to crack, because the quantity of crack rendered him ineligible
for relief under the First Step Act); cf. Boulding, 379 F. Supp. 3d at 648, 655 (resentencing defendant even though the PSR attributed more than 650 grams of crack to his conspiracy).
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Boulding’s sentence. Further, it demonstrates that section 404 of the Act
empowers judges to reduce the sentences of hundreds of defendants who
distributed crack cocaine before 2010.
In many respects, Mr. Boulding’s is an archetypal crack distribution
case. The relevant events commenced in the fall of 2007.11 That October,
Holly Williams served a month for retail fraud.12 The day of her release,
she met up with Mr. Boulding.13 He offered a deal: he would supply her
crack and pay her rent if she let him run his drug business out of her home
in Kalamazoo, Michigan.14 She took the deal,15 and Mr. Boulding cut,
packaged, and distributed crack from her house for nearly six months.16
Ms. Williams got tired of living in a crack house and enduring police
raids, so she asked Mr. Boulding to leave.17 He refused and threw her
belongings in the garbage.18 She and her landlord put up “no trespassing”
signs.19 The signs did no good.20 Eventually, Ms. Williams asked local
law enforcement to help her get Mr. Boulding out of the house.21 When
Mr. Boulding found out, he sent someone to scare her.22 Then, he called
child protective services on her.23 Finally, he asked an associate to kill
her.24 After that, the authorities took care of Ms. Williams’s housing.25
On February 28, 2008, the Kalamazoo Valley Enforcement Team
(KVET) entered Ms. Williams’s house and found Mr. Boulding sitting at
a kitchen table packaging crack.26 He tried to flee but the KVET officers
11. Transcript of Jury Trial at 5, United States v. Boulding, No. 1:08-cr-00065 (W.D. Mich.
filed Mar. 5, 2009). This story is derived from Ms. Williams’s trial testimony. She cooperated with
authorities against Mr. Boulding after she was arrested for crack possession in her home. Id. at 27–
34. The Government provided several inducements for her testimony. See id. at 12–13, 25 (describing the agreement between Ms. Williams and Mr. Boulding to provide her with rent money and
crack cocaine in exchange for Mr. Boulding running his deals out of her house).
12. Transcript of Jury Trial at 5, Boulding, No. 1:08-cr-00065.
13. Id. at 9–11.
14. Id. at 3, 9–12.
15. Id. at 12.
16. Id. at 12–13, 15, 34.
17. Id. at 26–27, 29.
18. Transcript of Jury Trial at 29, Boulding, No. 1:08-cr-00065.
19. Id. at 30.
20. Id.
21. Id. at 30–31.
22. Id. at 31.
23. Id.; see also id. at 61 (reporting the testimony during cross-examination of Ms. Williams’s
involvement with CPS when she pled guilty for possession of cocaine).
24. Transcript of Jury Trial at 61, Boulding, No. 1:08-cr-00065; see also id. at 422, 438–439
(reporting the testimony of Terry Tatum, co-conspirator, that Mr. Boulding had offered to pay him
to kill Ms. Williams). Mr. Tatum testified that they did not discuss the exact details or price for the
job, and he did not attempt to kill Ms. Williams. Id. at 439.
25. Id. at 61–62.
26. Boulding v. United States, No. 1:12-CV-133, 2012 WL 13050870, at *1 (W.D. Mich. Aug.
2, 2012).
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apprehended him.27 “After waiving his Miranda rights, [Mr. Boulding]
admitted to arresting officers that he was selling crack . . . .”28
On March 3, 2008, a Drug Enforcement Administration agent filed a
complaint against Mr. Boulding.29 Six months later, the case went to
trial.30 “At voir dire, fifty-two prospective jurors entered the courtroom,
and fourteen sat in the jury box.”31 They were all white; Mr. Boulding is
not.32 The impact of the jurors’ race on Mr. Boulding’s case is unclear.33
On October 3, 2008, the jury found Mr. Boulding guilty of the two
counts on trial: “conspiracy to distribute and to possess with intent to
distribute cocaine base . . . 50 grams or more . . . and possession with
intent to distribute 5 grams or more of crack cocaine . . . .”34
Prior to sentencing, probation filed a Presentence Report (PSR) that
attributed “over 650 grams of crack cocaine” to Mr. Boulding.35
Probation also recommended a two-level enhancement to the sentencing
guidelines range for weapons and a four-level enhancement for Mr.
Boulding’s leadership role.36 Mr. Boulding objected to the
enhancements.37
On April 24, 2009, Judge Jonker sentenced Mr. Boulding.38 Judge
Jonker denied Mr. Boulding’s objections and held that an “AK-47 was in
the mix of the conspiracy. . . . [T]he quantities exceeded the 500-gram
level of crack . . . [and] Mr. Boulding was plainly a leader, if not the
dominant leader of the group.”39 At the time, the enhancements did not

27. Id.
28. Id.
29. Complaint at 1, United States v. Boulding, No. 1:08-cr-00065 (W.D. Mich. filed Mar. 3,
2008).
30. Transcript of Jury Trial at 1, Boulding, No. 1:08-cr-00065.
31. United States v. Boulding, 412 F. App’x 798, 799 (6th Cir. 2011).
32. See id. (noting that the initial jurors all appeared to be White and the defendants, including
Mr. Boulding, are African American).
33. I.e., Mr. Boulding’s race could have affected myriad aspects of the criminal justice process,
including charging, attempts at plea bargaining, the jury’s verdict, his prison experience, etc.
34. See Verdict Form at 1, United States v. Boulding, No. 1:08-cr-00065 (W.D. Mich. filed Oct.
3, 2008) (finding Mr. Boulding and his co-conspirator Willie Rayshaun Richardson guilty of conspiracy); see also United States v. Boulding, 379 F. Supp. 3d 646, 648 (W.D. Mich. 2019) (“The
jury found that the quantity of crack cocaine involved in the conspiracy beyond a reasonable doubt
was 50 grams or more of crack cocaine, the highest quantity determination the verdict form asked
them to reach.”).
35. Boulding, 379 F. Supp. 3d at 648.
36. Transcript of Sent’g Hearing at 8, United States v. Boulding, No. 1:08-cr-00065 (W.D.
Mich. filed May 13, 2009).
37. Id.
38. Id. at 1.
39. Id. at 24–25.
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really matter. The statutory mandatory minimum for Mr. Boulding’s
crimes was life.40
Judge Jonker explained that “life in prison is not the sentence I would
impose on Mr. Boulding if I had the full discretion that I normally have
in sentencing.”41 But Congress had deprived him of that discretion.42 So,
Judge Jonker sentenced Mr. Boulding to life imprisonment on the
distribution count,43 and 360 months, concurrent, on the possession
count.44
In April 2009, Mr. Boulding appealed his conviction and sentence to
the Sixth Circuit.45 In February 2011, he lost his appeal.46
In July 2011, Mr. Boulding petitioned the Supreme Court for a writ of
certiorari.47 In October 2011, his writ was denied.48
In February 2012, Mr. Boulding filed for habeas relief under 28 U.S.C.
§ 2255.49 In August 2012, his motion was denied.50 After that, Mr.
Boulding stopped pursuing relief.
Then, on December 26, 2018, Mr. Boulding filed a pro se motion for
relief under section 404 of the First Step Act.51 On December 31, 2018,
the clerk of court docketed Mr. Boulding’s motion for resentencing.52
Within a month, the federal public defender moved to represent Mr.

40. See United States v. Boulding, 412 F. App’x 798, 801 (6th Cir. 2011) (explaining that Mr.
Boulding “had been convicted of two prior felony drug offenses, subjecting him to a mandatory
[statutory] minimum term of life imprisonment pursuant to 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(b)(1)(A),
841(b)(1)(B), and 851 . . . [for] the conspiracy charge.”).
41. Transcript of Sent’g Hearing at 3, Boulding, No. 1:08-cr-00065; see also Boulding, 412 F.
App’x at 801 (“The judge indicated that he would not have imposed a life sentence if he had the
discretion to impose a different sentence.”).
42. See Transcript of Sent’g Hearing at 3, Boulding, No. 1:08-cr-00065 (“[I]n some senses with
the congressional mandate of mandatory life in this situation, in some sense it’s an easy sentencing
hearing. There’s not a lot of guideline issues to talk about.”).
43. Judgment at 2, 1–2, United States v. Boulding, No. 1:08-cr-00065 (W.D. Mich. filed Apr.
27, 2009) (noting that Mr. Boulding was sentenced to life imprisonment on the distribution count
under 21 U.S.C. §§ 846, 841(a)(1), 841(b)(1)(A)(iii) and 851).
44. Id. (noting that Mr. Boulding was sentenced on the possession count under 21 U.S.C.
§§ 841(a)(1), 841(b)(1)(B)(iii), and 851).
45. Notice of Appeal, United States v. Boulding, No. 1:08-cr-00065 (W.D. Mich. filed Apr. 27,
2009).
46. United States v. Boulding, 412 F. App’x 798, 802 (6th Cir. 2011).
47. Letter from Sup. Ct., Boulding v. United States, No. 1:08-cr-00065 (filed July 11, 2011).
48. Boulding v. United States, 565 U.S. 892, 892 (2011) (denying cert.).
49. Boulding v. United States, No. 1:12-CV-133, 2012 WL 13050870, at *1 (W.D. Mich. Aug.
2, 2012).
50. Id. at *1, *5.
51. Motion for Resent’g, Boulding v. United States, No. 1:08-cr-00065 (W.D. Mich. Dec. 31,
2018); First Step Act of 2018, Pub. L. No. 115–391, § 404(b), 132 Stat. 5194, 5222 (2018).
52. Motion for Resent’g, Boulding, No. 1:08-cr-00065.
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Boulding.53 A few weeks later, the First Step Act arguments were fully
briefed.54
On May 16, 2019, Judge Jonker “exercise[d] [his] discretion to reduce
Defendant Boulding’s imprisonment to a term of years.”55 As of that day,
Mr. Boulding no longer faced a life sentence. But an important question
remains: did Judge Jonker have discretion to reduce Mr. Boulding’s
sentence to a term of years? This Article argues that the First Step Act
provides such authority.
I. THE AMBIGUOUS PROMISE OF THE FIRST STEP ACT
The First Step Act promised relief to inmates serving
disproportionately long sentences for cocaine base distribution.56 Section
404, the focus of this Article, seemed straightforward. Following more
than a decade of criminal justice reform, the First Step Act made
retroactive some statutory mandatory minimums.57 It also permitted
judges to review the sentences imposed in pre-2010 crack distribution
cases.58 In the spring and summer of 2019, district judges across the

53. See Docket at 23, United States v. Boulding, No. 1:08-cr-00065 (W.D. Mich. Jan. 31, 2019)
(“Federal Public Defender recommends that Anna Rebekah Rapa be appointed to represent defendant Walter Greenking Boulding.”); First Step Act of 2018, Pub. L. No. 115–391, § 404(b), 132 Stat.
5194, 5222 (2018).
54. See Gov’t Response to Defendant’s First Step Act Motion for Sent’g Reduction, United
States v. Boulding, No. 1:08-cr-00065 (W.D. Mich. filed Feb. 21, 2019); see also Defendant’s Brief
in Support of Sent’g Reduction Under the First Step Act, Boulding, No. 1:08-cr-00065 (W.D. Mich.
filed Feb. 27, 2019).
55. United States v. Boulding, 379 F. Supp. 3d 646, 656 (W.D. Mich. 2019), vacated in part,
960 F.3d 774 (6th Cir. 2020).
56. 164 CONG. REC. S7764 (daily ed. Dec. 18, 2018) (statement of Sen. Booker) (“Today we
have an opportunity to do something about addressing the ills of this system. That is why I am
proud this is a bipartisan compromise bill with extraordinary leadership on both sides of the aisle,
saying: Hey, there are things we need to begin to correct for this system. There are ways to make
this system more fair. There are ways to make this system better reflect our collective values and
ideals. Because of this collection of work done over the last years, this bill includes critical sentencing reform that will reduce mandatory minimums and give judges discretion back—not legislators but judges who sit and see the totality of the facts.”).
57. See, e.g., First Step Act of 2018, Pub. L. No. 115–391, § 404, 132 Stat. 5194, 5222 (2018)
(adopting the Fair Sentencing Act’s adjustments to 21 U.S.C. 841(b)(1)); see also Fair Sentencing
Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111–220, § 2, 124 Stat. 2372, 2372 (2010) (“(21 U.S.C. 841(b)(1)) is
amended—(1) in subparagraph (A)(iii), by striking ‘50 grams’ and inserting ‘280 grams . . . .’”).
58. See, e.g., Op. & Ord. at 648-50, 657, United States v. Boulding, 379 F. Supp. 3d (W.D.
Mich. 2019) (No. 1:08-cr-65-01) (“He was 29 years old at the time. . . . [T]he Court again made it
clear that life in prison was greater than necessary to achieve the purposes of sentencing . . . [stating] I don’t think it’s necessary to incapacitate Mr. Boulding and protect the public for life. I think
a lengthy custodial sentence followed by supervised release would do that. . . . But as the Court
stated then, and reiterates now, a sentence of life imprisonment is too much punishment.”).
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nation began reviewing the cases and reaching dissonant results.59
Appeals followed, largely focused on questions of judicial authority.
Section 404 appeals turned on four key issues: (1) who judges may
resentence (i.e., eligibility for relief), (2) whether judges may engage in
plenary resentencing or merely sentence reduction, (3) whether judges
may resentence all concurrent criminal convictions or only crack cocaine
convictions, and (4) whether judges must adopt the operative drug
quantity from the original sentencing.
By late spring 2020, the circuit courts had begun to determine the
extent of judicial authority under the First Step Act.60 Still, the law of
section 404 remained incomplete in every circuit, as discussed below.
Given the large number of First Step Act defendants,61 and the
complexity of these cases, this area of law will take years to develop.
This Article argues that the First Step Act affords judges adequate
authority to provide broad relief through resentencing. It proceeds in four
parts. First, this Article describes the modern federal sentencing process
59. See United States v. White, 413 F. Supp. 3d 15, 30 (D.D.C. 2019) (“White, Hicks, and
Hughes’ pending motions for reduced sentences under Section 404 raise several key questions with
which district courts across the country are grappling and arriving at different answers about the
scope of eligibility and available relief as well as the applicability of extant constitutional rules
articulated in Apprendi v. New Jersey . . . and Alleyne v. United States . . . .”) (citations omitted).
60. A May 22, 2020 Westlaw search of “U.S. Courts of Appeals Cases” for the phrase “First
Step Act” yielded 262 results. The author reviewed each result. A majority of these decisions concerned other facets of the First Step Act, such as compassionate release, and mentioned the First
Step Act in passing. See, e.g., United States v. Brown, 935 F.3d 43, 49 (2d Cir. 2019) (“Resentencing will also afford Brown the opportunity to argue that he should benefit from [S]ection 403(b) of
the First Step Act of 2018.”). In some cases, Courts of Appeals determined the First Step Act
granted district judge limited discretion to reduce a sentence rather than plenary resentencing authority. See, e.g., United States v. Hegwood, 934 F.3d 414, 415, 418 (5th Cir. 2019) (“[T]he First
Step Act does not allow plenary resentencing. . . . [But] [i]t is clear that the First Step Act grants a
district judge limited authority to consider reducing a sentence previously imposed.”). Some Courts
of Appeals held that the First Step Act’s change to the mandatory minimum sentence for defendants
with two or more prior serious drug convictions from life imprisonment to twenty-five years’ imprisonment did not apply retroactively to defendants sentenced before the Act’s enactment. See,
e.g., United States v. Means, 787 F. App’x 999, 1000–01 (11th Cir. Sept. 11, 2019) (“[T]his portion
of the First Step Act was not made retroactive to defendants who were sentenced before the Act’s
enactment on December 21, 2018.”). Many early 2019 cases included appeals filed prior to the
passage of the First Step Act, see, In re Scott, 764 F. App’x 261, 262 (3d Cir. 2019) (mem.) (“To
that end, the Federal Public Defender requested 30 days to examine Scott’s case to determine ‘if
the First Step Act impacts him, and whether that avenue is more advantageous than proceeding
under § 3582.’”). The D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit had one First Step Act
case involving a defendant sentenced in 2018. Young v. United States, 943 F.3d 460, 461 (D.C.
Cir. 2019). Still, more than ninety-nine cases had some bearing on the arguments in this Article and
were closely analyzed.
61. U.S. SENT’G COMM’N, FIRST STEP ACT OF 2018 RESENTENCING PROVISIONS
RETROACTIVITY DATA REPORT 4 (2019), https://www.ussc.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/researchand-publications/retroactivity-analyses/first-step-act/20191030-First-Step-Act-Retro.pdf
[https://perma.cc/TRB9-V7XD] (listing total number of granted motions for sentence reductions as
1,987 as of January 9, 2019).

74

Loyola University Chicago Law Journal

[Vol. 52

as context for the sentences challenged under the First Step Act. Second,
this Article offers a brief history of federal drug sentencing reform, from
the war on drugs to the First Step Act. This Article notes that by 2017,
many offenders had benefited from criminal justice reform,62 but a group
of defendants sentenced at the height of the nation’s “crack epidemic”63
remained unaffected. They are the defendants at issue in this Article.
Third, this Article addresses the four key section 404 issues in turn.
Fourth, this Article concludes that 18 U.S.C. § 3355 helps guide appellate
courts’ determinations of judicial authority under the First Step Act. It
also argues that three modern safeguards preclude a return to 1970s-era
indiscriminate sentencing: (1) the Sentencing Guidelines, (2) § 3553, and
(3) political attention.
II. FEDERAL SENTENCING: CONTEXT AND PROCESS
Typically, an assistant United States attorney files a charging
document with the federal district court64 and the criminal case begins.
The charging document channels the criminal defendant onto a pathway
that ends at sentencing. It lists specific charging statute(s),65 which can:
(1) mandate incarceration,66 (2) carry mandatory minimum penalties,67
62. See, e.g., Caryn Devins, Lessons Learned from Retroactive Resentencing after Johnson and
Amendment 782, 10 FED. CTS. L. REV. 39, 44–45 (2018) (“The proposed Guidelines amendment,
designated Amendment 782, reduced by two levels the offense levels assigned to the drug quantities
described in U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1. Absent an objection from Congress, the Amendment became effective November 1, 2014. The Commission voted to make the reduction retroactive. As a result, approximately 30,000 individuals had their sentences reduced, with an average decrease of 25
months.”); Colleen V. Chien, The Second Chance Gap, MICH. L. REV. (forthcoming 2020) (manuscript at 4–6); Johnson v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2551, 2562–63 (2015); Welch v. United States,
136 S. Ct. 1257, 1268 (2016).
63. See THE SENTENCING PROJECT, FEDERAL CRACK COCAINE SENTENCING 1 (2010),
https://www.sentencingproject.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/01/Federal-Crack-Cocaine-Sentencing.pdf [https://perma.cc/P9VW-KTV5] (“Newscasters used words like ‘crisis’ and ‘epidemic’—
later shown to be exaggerated—to describe the impact of crack.”).
64. Typically, a charging document is an Information, but Walter Boulding’s case commenced
with a Complaint filed by a Drug Enforcement Administration agent. See Complaint at 1, United
States v. Boulding, No. 1:08-cr-00065 (W.D. Mich. filed Mar. 3, 2008). Page one of that Complaint
contained the relevant charging statutes, as sworn by the agent. Id.
65. E.g., 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1), (b)(1) and § 846 are typical charging statutes for cocaine base
cases.
66. The specific charging statute(s) can mandate incarceration rather than probation. See 18
U.S.C. § 3561(a) (2010) (“In general . . . a defendant who has been found guilty of an offense may
be sentenced to a term of probation unless—(1) the offense is a Class A or Class B felony and the
defendant is an individual . . . .”).
67. See, e.g., 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(A) (imposing a ten-year mandatory minimum sentence on
defendants convicted of manufacturing or distributing certain drugs at minimum specified quantities (e.g., fifty grams or more of methamphetamines)); cf. Stephen J. Schulhofer, Rethinking Mandatory Minimums, 28 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 199, 205 (1993) (“The principal statute, 21 U.S.C.
§ 841(a), declares it to be unlawful for any person to manufacture or distribute a controlled

2020]

Judicial Authority Under the First Step Act

75

(3) require consecutive sentencing,68 and (4) establish terms of postincarceration release.69 The charging document also lists key facts of the
offense.70 These offense-related facts, along with the offense conduct and
criminal history facts found at sentencing, trigger certain sentencing
guidelines.71
Prior to sentencing, the prosecutor and defense counsel send memos to
the probation officer preparing the Presentence Report; the memos
discuss the offense conduct, including any estimated drug quantities, and
the defendant’s criminal history.72 The attorneys typically file sentencing
memos with the court as well. At sentencing, a judge uses the charging
statute(s) to determine statutory maximum and minimum penalties. Then,
the judge considers the defendant’s past criminal history,73 present
criminal conduct, and, when relevant, drug quantity, to calculate a
sentencing guidelines range.74 Today, the guidelines range is
substance. The penalty provisions, set forth in § 841(b), provide that ‘in the case of a violation of
subsection (a) of this section involving [various drug quantities], such person shall be sentenced to
a term of imprisonment which may not be less than [various terms of years].’ . . . To date, the courts
have uniformly held that the drug quantities specified in § 841(b) are not elements of the offense
but solely sentencing factors to be considered by the judge.”).
68. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. §§ 1028A(a)(1), (b)(2) (2004) (requiring a two-year consecutive term
of imprisonment for identity theft in conjunction with any of the statute’s enumerated felonies).
69. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 3583(d) (setting specific minimum and maximum terms for supervised
release after imprisonment for convictions under 18 U.S.C. § 2243(b) (sexual abuse of a ward)
triggering a post-incarceration requirement to register as a sex offender under 18 U.S.C. § 3583(d)).
70. See, e.g., Information at 1–3, United States v. Chesney, No. 18-cr-00257 (D. Conn. filed
Oct. 23, 2018) (listing the defendant’s two alleged health care fraud co-conspirators, the alleged
initiation dates for those conspiracies, the types of information the defendant allegedly stole from
Medicaid client files, and the onset date for the defendant’s use of her cell phone to photograph
Medicaid client files, etc.).
71. See, e.g., U.S. SENT’G GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2D1.1(a)(1) (U.S. SENT’G COMM’N 2018)
(describing that a base level offense of 43 is reached “if the defendant is convicted under 21 U.S.C.
§ 841(b)(1)(A), (b)(1)(B), or (b)(1)(C), or 21 U.S.C. § 960(b)(1), (b)(2), or (b)(3), and the offense
of conviction establishes that death or serious bodily injury resulted from the use of the substance
and that the defendant committed the offense after one or more prior convictions for a similar offense”).
72. Alan Ellis, Federal Presentence Investigation Report, 29 CRIM. JUST. 48, 48 (2014) (“In
most cases, this [prosecutorial] memo is neither flattering nor helpful to the client. Accordingly,
our [defense] office prepares our own memo for the USPO . . . .”).
73. I.e., id. at 48, 49. The offense conduct determined at sentencing may comprise facts: (1)
pled by the defendant, (2) adopted from Probation’s PSR, or (3) found by a jury or judge. The judge
will separately find the defendant’s criminal history category based upon the filings of the parties
and probation.
74. See Peugh v. United States, 569 U.S. 530, 536 (2013) (“First, ‘a district court should begin
all sentencing proceedings by correctly calculating the applicable Guidelines range. As a matter of
administration and to secure nationwide consistency, the Guidelines should be the starting point
and the initial benchmark.’”) (quoting Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 49 (2007)); see also U.S.
SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL, supra note 71, at § 5(A) (demonstrating that the judge locates
the total offense level on the left-vertical axis of the Sentencing Table and the criminal history
category on the top-horizontal axis, e.g., for a criminal history category II with a total offense level
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normative.75 Prior to 2005, as discussed below, the guidelines were
treated as mandatory.
The statutory and guidelines parameters can be altered by plea
agreements, government motions, and—in certain drug cases—the
statutory safety valve.76 A court may impose a sentence below a statutory
minimum when (1) the government drops the count(s) carrying the
mandatory minimum(s),77 (2) the government properly moves for a
substantial assistance departure,78 or (3) the defendant in a controlled

of 17, the resulting guideline range is 27-33 months); see also id. at § 2D.1.1(a)(5) (“Base Offense
Level (Apply the greatest): . . . (5) the offense level specified in the Drug Quantity Table set forth
in subsection (c) . . . .”).
75. See Peugh, 569 U.S. at 537 (“We have indicated that ‘a district court’s decision to vary from
the advisory Guidelines may attract greatest respect when’ it is based on the particular facts of a
case. Overall, this system ‘requires a court to give respectful consideration to the Guidelines,’ but
it ‘permits the court to tailor the sentence in light of other statutory concerns as well.’”) (citations
omitted).
76. 18 U.S.C. § 3553 (f); U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL, supra note 71, at § 5K1.1;
Peter A. Joy & Rodney J. Uphoff, Sentencing Reform: Fixing Root Problems, 87 UMKC L. REV.
97, 102 (2018); First Step Act, ESP INSIDER EXPRESS SPECIAL EDITION (U.S. Sent’g Comm’n),
Feb. 2019 at 7 [hereinafter ESP INSIDER EXPRESS] (explaining that section 402 of the First Step
Act broadens the safety valve at 18 U.S.C. § 3553(f)).
77. The government may drop counts of the charging document for lack of evidence or to induce
a guilty plea on other counts. U.S. Dep’t of Just., Just. Manual § 9-27.400 (2018) (The basic policy
is that charges are not to be bargained away or dropped in ways that represent a significant departure
from the principles set forth herein.”). Most criminal defendants will ultimately plead guilty to one
or more counts of the charging document or superseding document (e.g., a superseding Indictment).
See also Joy & Uphoff, supra note 76, at 98; (“[N]early all defendants plead guilty . . . . [E]ven
innocent defendants will decide to plead guilty instead of going to trial . . . .”); Miko M. Wilford,
Annabelle Shestak & Gary L. Wells, Plea Bargaining, in PSYCH. SCI. & L. 266, 266–67 (Neil
Brewer & Amy Bradfield Douglass ed., 2019) (“Over 97% of U.S. federal convictions . . . are secured via guilty pleas and are never presented at trial . . . . [T]he United States accepts . . . bargains
that can . . . reduce defendants’ charges (charge bargaining) . . . .”) (citation omitted); see also Missouri v. Frye, 566 U.S. 134, 144 (2012) (“To a large extent . . . horse trading . . . determines who
goes to jail and for how long. That is what plea bargaining is. It is not some adjunct to the criminal
justice system; it is the criminal justice system.”) (citations omitted).
78. See U.S. SENT’G GUIDELINES MANUAL, supra note 7171, at § 5K (noting dissonance within
the Circuits regarding sufficient support for a government motion for departure from a statutory
mandatory minimum). Ideally, the government: (1) files a § 5K1.1 motion, (2) details the substantial assistance provided by the cooperating witness, (3) invokes the judge’s power to depart from
the statutory minimum under § 3553(e), and (4) specifically asks the judge to depart below the
statutory mandatory minimum. See, 18 U.S.C. § 3553(e) (“Upon motion of the Government, the
court shall have the authority to impose a sentence below a level established by statute as a minimum sentence so as to reflect a defendant’s substantial assistance in the investigation or prosecution
of another person who has committed an offense.”); U.S. SENT’G GUIDELINES MANUAL, supra
note 71, at § 1B1.8 (explaining that the government’s motion should specify whether it is requesting
the court to grant a departure below the statutory minimum, below the bottom of the guideline
range, or both.); AN OVERVIEW OF MANDATORY MINIMUM PENALTIES IN THE FEDERAL
CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM 42 (U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N 2017) (“[O]ffenders convicted of an
offense carrying a mandatory minimum penalty are provided an incentive to plead guilty . . . . 18
U.S.C. § 3553(e) grants the court limited authority to impose a sentence below a mandatory minimum penalty.”).
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substances case meets the exacting criteria for a safety valve departure.79
A defendant facing a mandatory statutory minimum under 21 U.S.C.
§§ 841, 844, 846, 960, or 96380 may receive a sentence below that
minimum by “meeting certain ‘safety valve’ requirements as a low-level
nonviolent offender.”81 On its face, the statutory safety valve is a matter
of judicial discretion. In reality, prosecutors are also gatekeepers of the
safety valve because they dictate the terms of witness cooperation.82
In sum, federal sentencing begins with a charging document. That
document sets a statutory framework that can be altered by plea, motion,
or, in narrow circumstances, the statutory safety valve. The charging
document, combined with additional facts submitted by probation or the
parties, enables the judge to calculate a sentencing guidelines range. A
typical federal criminal sentence reflects a charging document, a plea
agreement, a draft and final PSR, probation’s sealed sentencing
recommendation to the judge, the government’s sentencing
memorandum, and the defendant’s sentencing memorandum.83 Based
upon this information, the judge strives to impose a parsimonious
sentence that is “sufficient, but not greater than necessary”84 to achieve
justice.
For decades, Congress limited the discretion of sentencing judges,
particularly in drug cases.85 Federal laws compelled lengthy sentences
for defendants like Mr. Boulding. Judge Jonker and others criticized the
severe results. But Congress did not relent until 2010. By then, the federal
prison population had grown significantly.86
79. See MONA LYNCH, HARD BARGAINS: THE COERCIVE POWER OF DRUG LAWS IN FEDERAL
COURT 30 (2016) [hereinafter LYNCH, HARD BARGAINS] (explaining that, pre-First Step Act, the
safety valve test requires that (1) the defendant generally had no more than a petty misdemeanor,
(2) the defendant did not use violence or a gun during the offense, (3) no serious bodily injury or
death resulted, (4) the defendant was not a leader in the offense, and (5) the defendant truthfully
provided information and evidence to the government).
80. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(f).
81. Patti B. Saris, A Generational Shift for Federal Drug Sentences, 52 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1, 6
(2015).
82. See LYNCH, HARD BARGAINS, supra note 79, at 31 (“In particular, the fifth prong can become a sticking point, as some U.S. attorneys expect defendants to inform on their coconspirators
in order to earn the safety valve.”).
83. See, e.g., Docket, United States v. Holloway, No. 18-cr-00147 (D. Conn. July 10, 2018)
(docket including the following filings: ECF No. 1: Sealed Complaint; No. 25: Plea Agreement;
No. 37: Presentence Investigation Report (Draft Report); No. 38: Presentence Investigation Report
(Final Report); No. 39: Sealed Sent’g Recommendation; No. 40: Defendant’s Sent'g Memorandum;
No. 41: Gov’t’s Sent’g. Memorandum); but note that there are differences across districts and eras
(e.g., with respect to, for example, whether the government will file a sentencing memorandum).
84. 18 U.S.C. § 3553 (a).
85. See LYNCH, HARD BARGAINS, supra note 79, at 31 (“[T]he bulk of sentencing reforms
through the mid-2000s served to ensure lengthy sentences, especially in drug cases . . . .”).
86. See Past Inmate Populations Totals, FED. BUREAU PRISONS (Dec. 26, 2019)
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III. CONGRESSIONAL REFORM OF THE FEDERAL SENTENCING SYSTEM:
1980–2018
Modern criticism of federal sentencing began in the 1950s87 and
reached a fever pitch in the late 1970s.88 From mid-century,
criminologists and legal scholars documented empirical differences in
sentencing, including above-average prison terms for African
Americans89 and male offenders.90 In the 1970s, academics and
journalists reported striking differences among districts91 and circuits.92

https://www.bop.gov/mobile/about/population_statistics.jsp#old_pops [https://perma.cc/SEN5S4D3] (showing that the federal prison population grew by nearly 800% from 1980 to 2010).
87. See Michael H. Tonry, Criminal Law: The Missing Element in Sentencing Reform, 35
VAND. L. REV. 607, 607–08 (1982) (explaining that the earlier reform led to mid-century indeterminate sentencing).
88. See, e.g., Peter B. Hoffman & Michael A. Stover, Reform in the Determination of Prison
Terms: Equity, Determinacy, and the Parole Release Function, 7 HOFSTRA L. REV. 89, 95 (1978)
(“The literature on sentencing is replete with examples of widely disparate sentences imposed on
similarly situated offenders.”); Shepard v. United States, 257 F.2d 293, 294 (6th Cir. 1958) (arguing
that the justice system is not focused on protecting defendants during sentencing); Louis B.
Schwartz, Options in Constructing a Sentencing System: Sentencing Guidelines Under Legislative
or Judicial Hegemony, 67 VA. L. REV. 637, 691 (1981) (“Rehabilitation replaces retribution as the
dominant goal of penal systems. Retribution makes a comeback.”).
89. See 1972 Sentencing Study, Southern District of New York: Hearing Before the Subcomm.
on Crim. L. & Procedures of the Comm. on the Judiciary of the U.S. Sen., 93rd Cong. 5340 (1973)
[hereinafter 1972 Sentencing Study] (showing that the U.S. Attorney’s Office for the Southern District of New York found that 28% of white defendants convicted of interstate thefts were sentenced
to prison during a four-year period, while 48% of African American defendants convicted of the
same offense were incarcerated, etc.).
90. See Debra A. Curran, Judicial Discretion and Defendant’s Sex, 21 CRIMINOLOGY 41, 42,
51–52 (1983) (discussing how research on gender disparities in sentencing had previously failed to
“control for legally relevant variables such as seriousness of offense and criminal history of the
defendant,” but finding that when controlling for these variables, “[f]emale defendants received
more lenient dispositions than their male counterparts, even when offense seriousness[,] total
counts, and criminal history were controlled”).
91. See 1972 Sentencing Study, supra note 89, at 5342 (reporting that the U.S. Attorney’s Office
for the Southern District of New York evaluated 645 sentences and found that “a person convicted
of interstate transportation of a stolen motor vehicle in [S.D.N.Y.] will receive a 50% higher sentence than a person convicted in [N.D.N.Y.]. If he has the misfortune of being convicted in
[E.D.N.Y.], the sentence will be more than double that of the [N.D.N.Y.].”).
92. Franklin D. Kramer, Different Judges, Different Justice, WASH. POST, Nov. 14, 1975, at
A3, reprinted in 121 CONG. REC. 36731–732 (1975) (statement of Sen. Kennedy); Hoffman &
Stover, supra note 88, at 95 (“In 1967, the President’s Commission on Law Enforcement and the
Administration of Justice reported this problem as pervasive. In 1973, the National Advisory Commission on Criminal Justice Standards and Goals described sentencing practices in this country as
appalling.”); TWENTIETH CENTURY FUND. & ALAN M. DERSHOWITZ, FAIR AND CERTAIN
PUNISHMENT: REPORT OF THE TWENTIETH CENTURY FUND TASK FORCE ON CRIMINAL
SENTENCING (1976). Cf., 1 NAT’L RES. COUNCIL, RESEARCH ON SENTENCING: THE SEARCH FOR
REFORM 13–20 (Alfred Blumstein et al. eds., 1983) (urging caution regarding empirical studies of
demographic drivers of sentencing disparities because many findings were preliminary, magnitudes
of effects were not always known, non-demographic offender characteristics accounted for significant sentencing variances, etc.).
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A 1975 Washington Post article read:
While the average federal sentence was 42.2 months, it was 18.4 months
in the Southern District of Georgia, yet 94.9 months in the Western
District of Michigan. Average bank robbers received 134.5 months
nationwide, but in Northern District of Georgia, they received 204
months, while in Northern District of Illinois only 67.1.93

By the late 1970s, sentencing was viewed “as arbitrary, discriminatory,
and unprincipled.”94 Many felt that “the broad discretion of sentencing
courts and parole officers had led to significant sentencing disparities
among similarly situated offenders.”95 Prison officials reported hostility
among offenders serving disparate sentences for similar crimes.96
Meanwhile, the public was incensed by the nation’s growing crime
problem.

93. Kramer, supra note 92, at A3; see also id. (“Different judges choose [sentences] differently.”).
94. See Hoffman & Stover, supra note 88, at 89 (quoting NORVAL MORRIS, THE FUTURE OF
IMPRISONMENT 45 (1974)) (describing the widespread criticism of sentencing procedures); Norval
Morris, The Sentencing Disease: The Judge’s Changing Role in the Criminal Justice Process, 18
JUDGES J. 8, 9 (1979) (“Careful research and professional knowledge have established that our state
and federal sentencing systems are characterized by unjust disparities. Like cases are not treated
alike. Sentencing remains a random lottery.”). See also Kevin Clancy et al., Sentence Decisionmaking: The Logic of Sentence Decisions and the Extent and Sources of Sentence Disparity, 72 J. CRIM.
L. & CRIMINOLOGY 524, 534–35 (1981) (“The survey [in which 264 active federal judges were
given sentencing hypotheticals and interviewed] results suggests that sentence disparity does exist.
The amount of such disparity varies depending on which aspect of the sentencing decision is examined. If one concentrates strictly on the decision to incarcerate, the disparity is modest. However,
when one examines the full range of sentencing options simultaneously, more dissensus appears.
More variance in sentences is explained by differences among individual judges than by any other
single factor.”); 1972 Sentencing Study, supra note 89, at 5341 (1973) (“During the six-month period covered by the Southern District of New York sentencing study, . . . [t]he chances of a defendant going to jail are still largely determined by which judge his case is assigned to.”).
95. See Peugh v. United States, 569 U.S. 530, 535 (2013) (noting that the disparities in sentencing prior to 1984 led to the creation of the United States Sentencing Commission); see also Edward
M. Kennedy, Toward a New System of Criminal Sentencing: Law with Order, 16 AM. CRIM. L.
REV. 353, 354 (1979) (“For example, a bank robber may receive a judicially mandated sentence
ranging from probation to a twenty-five year prison term, but it is the United States Parole Commission, not the court, that typically decides the point at which the convicted offender should be
released.”). Cf. Stephen J. Schulhofer, Due Process of Sentencing, 128 U. PA. L. REV. 733, 734
(1980) (“Scholars, legislators, and reformers share common ground . . . that judicial discretion
should not be entirely eliminated, but that it should operate within much narrower bounds, should
be informed by meaningful standards, and should be subject to appellate review. . . . Control of
judicial discretion could cause many more problems than it solves, unless prosecutorial discretion
and plea bargaining are also brought under control.”); Martin R. Gardner, The Determinate Sentencing Movement and the Eighth Amendment: Excessive Punishment Before and After Rummel v.
Estelle, 1980 DUKE L. J. 1103, 1124, 1139 (1980) (arguing that the courts had begun to tackle the
problem of disparately harsh sentencing in capital cases and a small number of non-capital cases,
and cautioning against legislated determinate sentencing).
96. See Hoffman & Stover, supra note 88, at 95–96 (“Prison officials have stressed that disparities are particularly apparent when offenders are confined together. This creates frustration and
hostility that is demoralizing and counterproductive to rehabilitative efforts.”).
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During the 1960s and 70s, violent crime and homicide rates increased
nearly every year, sometimes by double-digits.97 The public was
“terrified of crime in the streets,”98 particularly aggravated assault,
murder, rape, and robbery.99 Many believed that haphazard sentencing
was undermining deterrence and contributing to recidivism.100 Their
dissatisfaction fueled a growing criminal justice reform movement.
Throughout the 1970s, corrections experts, academics, and legislators
debated sentencing reform.101 By mid-decade, the “sentencing reform
movement [was] underway in earnest,”102 at least in the states.103 By
1980, according to Senator Edward M. Kennedy, “the battle lines [were]
drawn between those who advocate[d] liberal use of imprisonment (with
little or no express encouragement of sentencing alternatives) and those
97. See ALEXIA COOPER & ERICA L. SMITH, BUREAU OF JUST. STATISTICS, NCJ 236018,
HOMICIDE TRENDS IN THE UNITED STATES, 1980–2008, 2 (2011) (“The homicide rate doubled
from the early 1960s to the late 1970s, increasing from 4.6 per 100,000 U.S. residents in 1962 to
9.7 per 100,000 by 1979. . . . In 1980 the rate peaked at 10.2 per 100,000 and subsequently fell to
7.9 per 100,000 in 1984.”); NATHAN JAMES, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R45236, RECENT VIOLENT
CRIME TRENDS IN THE UNITED STATES 4 (2018) (depicting yearly increases and decreases in the
annual violent crime rate from 1960 to 2016); STEVEN PINKER, THE BETTER ANGELS OF OUR
NATURE: WHY VIOLENCE HAS DECLINED 92 (2012) (depicting twentieth-century United States
and English homicide rates).
98. David L. Bazelon, Missed Opportunities in Sentencing Reform, 7 HOFSTRA L. REV. 57, 57
(1978).
99. S. JOURNAL , 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 646 (1975) (statement of the President of the United
States given by the President of the Senate Pro Tempore) (postulating that these crimes trouble the
citizenry the most).
100. See Schulhofer, Due Process of Sentencing, supra note 95, at 733–34 (“Several factors, by
now familiar to a wide public, have generated a broad consensus in support of one immediate
goal—the restriction of judicial sentencing discretion. . . . The inconsistencies and uncertainties
associated with broad, unstructured discretion are, of course, unfair in themselves; they are also
thought to undermine the deterrent effectiveness of the criminal law and to promote resentment
among prisoners, thereby increasing their sense of alienation and mistrust. The sentencing process
has come to seem so haphazard that it generates cynicism among the public and lack of confidence
in the regularity, reliability, and effectiveness of the legal system generally.”).
101. See Edward M. Kennedy, Commentary—The Federal Criminal Code Reform Act and New
Sentencing Alternatives, 82 W. VA. L. REV. 423, 428 (1980) (“During the past decade, the debate
over criminal sentencing reform has intensified in Congress, in state legislatures, and among academicians and corrections experts.”).
102 See, e.g., Tonry, supra note 87, at 607; see also id. at 607–08 (“Denver has adopted the first
descriptive sentencing guidelines system. The California legislature enacted the California Uniform
Determinate Sentencing Law in 1976. Several states, including New York and Massachusetts, have
enacted mandatory sentencing laws, and Maine adopted a determinate sentencing statute and abolished its parole board in 1976.”); id. at 616–23 (reviewing contemporary sentencing reforms across
the states.
103. See, e.g., S. JOURNAL, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 646 (1975) (showing early federal reform
efforts—“[b]y Mr. Kennedy . . . . S. 2698. A bill to amend title 18, United States Code, so as to
impose mandatory minimum terms with respect to certain offenses, and for other purposes, Referred to the Committee on the Judiciary. By Mr. Kennedy. . . . S. 2699. A bill to amend title 18,
United States Code, so as to establish certain guidelines for sentencing, establish a United States
Commission on Sentencing, and for other purposes. Referred to the Committee on the Judiciary.”).
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who urge[d] that there be a general presumption against imprisonment,
and more innovative and imaginative alternatives to a sentence of
imprisonment.”104 Both sides agreed that the federal system was not
working105 and that federal judges were largely ambivalent about
reform.106
In 1984, Congress passed the Sentencing Reform Act107 as part of the
larger Comprehensive Crime Control Act.108 The Sentencing Reform Act
abolished the federal parole system,109 established judicial sentencing
factors,110 and instituted drug quantity sentencing.111 But the
“centerpiece of the Act was its establishment of a permanent sentencing

104. Kennedy, supra note 95, at 356 (noting that over the past decade “the debate over sentencing reform ha[d] intensified”).
105. Id.; see also Kramer, supra note 92, at A3 (“The need for reform has been recognized in
Congress. None other than [Republican] Senator Roman Hruska of Nebraska has stated that it
‘seems somehow unfair’ that sentencing disparities should be so great.”).
106. See JOHN BARTOLOMEO, FED. J.R. PROGRAM, FJRP-81/005, JUDICIAL REACTIONS TO
SENTENCING GUIDELINES 3–4 (1981) (“While federal judges hardly offer wholesale endorsements
of current federal sentencing practices, relatively few express serious criticism of the current process. More than one-third (38%) believe that the current process is either ‘ideal’ or ‘about the best
that can be achieved.’ Another third (35%) regard it as ‘adequate.’[By contrast s]ixty-four percent
of U.S. Attorneys/Assistant U.S. Attorneys and 57% of defense attorneys (as contrasted with 23%
of the judiciary) find fault with current sentencing practices (Table 1 [note: Federal judges n=264;
U.S. Attorneys/AUSAs n=103; Defense attorneys n=100]); cf. Frank A. Kaufman, The Sentencing
Views of Yet Another Judge, 66 GEO. L. J. 1247, 1256 (1978) (“None of us who perform sentencing
functions can look with any great degree of pride upon the systems which we have built and which
we administer. But . . . I believe that they are soundly bottomed and that we should move at long
last toward their prompt implementation, not toward their abandonment.”).
107. Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98–473, § 211, 98 Stat. 1987.
108. Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98–473, 98 Stat. 1976.
109. See, e.g., Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, Pub. L. 98–473, tit. II, ch. 2, sec. 214(c), 98
Stat. 2014 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 5042) (“Section 5042 is amended by—(1) striking
out ‘parole or’ each place it appears in the caption and text; and (2) striking out ‘parolee or’.”).
110. See id. at sec. 212(a)(2), § 3553(a), 98 Stat. 1987, 1989 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C.
§ 3553(a)) (requiring sentencing judges to consider seven individualized sentencing factors in determining the particular sentence to be imposed, including “(1) the nature and circumstances of the
offense, and the history and characteristics of the defendant”).
111. See United States v. Wirsing, 943 F.3d 175, 177 (4th Cir. 2019) (“In 1970, Congress enacted the Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act, which separated drugs into five
‘schedules’ according to their potential for abuse. The statute assigned penalties in accordance with
a drug’s schedule and whether it was a narcotic, without considering quantity (with one minor
exception related to distribution of ‘a small amount of marihuana for no remuneration’). That
changed in 1984, when Congress introduced quantities to the [Controlled Substances Penalties
Amendments Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98–473, § 502, 98 Stat. 1837, 2068–69 (codified at 21
U.S.C. § 841(b))] statute.”) (citations omitted).
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commission”112 to promulgate mandatory sentencing guidelines.113
The commission’s new guidelines went into effect in late 1987.114
Initial reviews of their effects were mixed. Within a few years, the
commission reported modest reductions in sentencing disparities among
certain drug and fraud offenders.115 Some practicing attorneys and judges
also reported greater “fairness, uniformity, and certainty” in
sentencing.116
But others felt that the guidelines were yielding harsher sentences,117
especially for African American defendants.118 The 100-to-1 sentencing
112. See Hon. William W. Wilkins, Jr., Response to Judge Heaney, 29 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 795,
798 (1992) (“The centerpiece of the [Sentencing Reform] Act was its establishment of a permanent
sentencing commission to develop and, over time, refine sentencing Guidelines that would channel
the previously unguided sentencing discretion of judges.”); see also Comprehensive Crime Control
Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98–473, tit. II, ch. 2, sec. 217(a), § 991, 98 Stat. 1837 (2017) (codified at
28 U.S.C. § 991) (“There is established as an independent commission in the judicial branch of the
United States a United States Sentencing Commission . . . .”).
113. See, e.g., Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, tit. II, ch. 2, sec. 212(a)(2),
§ 3553(b), 98 Stat. 1989–90 (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b)) (“Application of Guidelines in Imposing a Sentence—[t]he court shall impose a sentence of the kind, and within the range, referred
to in subsection (a)(4) unless the court finds that there exists an aggravating or mitigating circumstance that was not adequately taken into consideration by the Sentencing Commission in formulating the guidelines that should result in a sentence different from that described.”); cf. United
States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 245 (2005) (“We answer the question of remedy by finding the
provision of the federal sentencing statute that makes the Guidelines mandatory, incompatible with
today’s constitutional holding.”).
114. Wilkins, supra note 112, at 799 (“[The Guidelines] became effective on November 1,
1987.”).
115. See id. at 808 (“The Commission recently analyzed sentences before and after Guideline
implementation for offenders convicted of bank robbery, cocaine distribution, heroin distribution,
and bank embezzlement. . . . Overall, the research demonstrated that the range of sentences imposed on the majority of offenders has decreased significantly under the Guidelines, compared to
sentences imposed under the old law on similar offenders convicted of similar offenses.”).
116. Id. at 820; see also Joe B. Brown, The Sentencing Guidelines are Reducing Disparity, 29
AM. CRIM. L. REV. 875, 876–77 (1992) (“[M]y experience with the Guidelines has reinforced my
firm belief that they have reduced disparity and, for the most part, do produce fairer sentences.
Despite continual criticism from many judges and the defense bar, the opinion of the U.S. Attorneys
and Assistants who work closely with the Guidelines is overwhelmingly favorable.”).
117. See Gerald W. Heaney, Revisiting Disparity: Debating Guidelines Sentencing, 29 AM.
CRIM. L. REV. 771, 772 (1992) (reviewing sentencing data for four districts of the Eighth Circuit
in 1989 and concluding that “an offender sentenced under the new Guidelines in place, offenders
were now likely to serve sentences more than twice as long as someone sentenced under pre-Guidelines law”).
118. See Joseph F. Weis Jr., The Federal Sentencing Guidelines – It’s Time for a Reappraisal,
29 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 823, 826 (1992) (discussing the harsh results produced by the Guidelines
given certain offenders’ socio-economic circumstances); Gerald F. Uelmen, Federal Sentencing
Guidelines: A Cure Worse than the Disease, 29 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 899, 901 (1992) (“[T]he addicted prostitute who took telephone messages goes off to federal prison for five or six years, the
addict street dealer gets at least nine years, while the sophisticated supplier who organized the enterprise ends up with an eighteen-month sentence.”); MICHAEL TONRY, SENTENCING FRAGMENTS:
PENAL REFORM IN AMERICA, 1975–2005 (2016) (discussing how the guidelines were criticized on
normative, fairness, outcome, technocratic, and policy grounds).
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disparity between crack cocaine and powder cocaine, for instance,
“closely track[ed] inner city ethnic and racial lines” and resulted in
significantly longer sentences for urban African American defendants.119
The effect of the guidelines, on their own, was difficult to determine
because the guidelines were part of a larger tough-on-crime framework.
The guidelines were instituted at the height of the tough-on-crime
era.120 From the beginning, the guidelines were supplemented by
“statutory mandatory minimum and enhancement sentencing schemes
passed by Congress on a regular basis.”121 As the Honorable Joseph F.
Weis Jr. of the Third Circuit observed, mandatory minimums were
“applied most frequently in cases of illegal drug trafficking . . . [and]
[t]he imprisonment terms [were] arbitrarily selected by Congress, often
seemingly as a response to a perceived public call to be ‘tough on
crime.’”122 For example, the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986 “greatly
enhanced the use of mandatory prison sentences for many drug

119. See Uelmen, supra note 118, at 904; see also id. (“This means that the Guideline sentence
for a white defendant selling one ounce of powdered cocaine on Long Island is level fourteen
(fifteen to twenty-one months) while the Guideline sentence for a black defendant selling one ounce
of ‘crack’ cocaine in Harlem is level twenty-eight (seventy-eight to ninety-seven months)”);
Heaney, supra note 117, at 778 (“[T]he weight of drugs ‘involved in the crime’ includes not only
the drugs an offender has in his possession when apprehended, but also any and all additional
quantities that can be considered ‘part of the same course of conduct or common scheme or plan’
as the offense of conviction.”).
120. TONRY, supra note 118, at 96 (2016) (“The legislation was enacted, the commission was
appointed, and the guidelines took effect . . . just as the tough on crime period hit its stride.”); see
also Heaney, supra note 117, at 781 (“The Commission has blamed the longer sentences given to
Blacks on mandatory minimum sentencing laws and prosecutors’ failure to consistently charge
conduct requiring these sentences. I believe these are important factors, but the Guidelines
themselves play a role in the disparities.”); see also EMILY BAZELON, CHARGED: THE NEW
MOVEMENT TO TRANSFORM AMERICAN PROSECUTION AND END MASS INCARCERATION 40
(2019) (“As crime rose in the late 1970s and early 1980s, however, so did public concern about
violence committed by people who were out of jail awaiting trial. In 1984, Congress amended the
Bail Reform Act, instructing federal judges to consider dangerousness in setting bail. For crimes of
violence, as well as some drug crimes, the presumption in federal cases would now be confinement,
not release.”).
121. LYNCH, HARD BARGAINS, supra note 79, at 60; see also Mona Lynch, Booker
Circumvention? Adjudication Strategies in the Advisory Sentencing Guidelines Era, 43 N.Y.U.
REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 59, 63 n.15 (2019) [hereinafter Lynch, Booker Circumvention?] (“The
Guidelines have also been supplemented by statutory mandatory minimum and enhancement
sentencing schemes passed by Congress on a regular basis since 1984.”).
122. Weis supra note 118, at 823; see also id. (“Mandatory minimums require judges to
impose prison terms of not less than the number of years specified by Congress as punishment for
certain offenses . . . . These sentences must be imposed without regard to such factors . . . often
used by courts in determining appropriate punishment.”).
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offenses.”123 It also originated the crack to powder cocaine disparity.124
The Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988 “creat[ed] a mandatory minimum
penalty for simple possession of crack cocaine . . . the only federal
mandatory minimum for a first offense of simple possession of a
controlled substance.”125
The new sentencing regime contributed to a nearly eightfold increase
in the federal prison population from 1980 to 2010.126 By the late 1990s,
it was clear that Congress had upset the balance of the federal sentencing
system.127 This time, reform began with the Court.
In the mid-2000s, the Supreme Court held that mandatory sentencing
guidelines violated defendants’ constitutional rights in Booker, Gall, and
Kimbrough.128 In Booker, a jury found beyond a reasonable doubt that
the defendant possessed at least 50 grams of crack cocaine.129 That
amount translated to a guidelines sentence of 210 to 262 months.130
However, the sentencing judge found by a preponderance of the evidence

123. FREDERIC G. REAMER, HEINOUS CRIME: CASES, CAUSES, AND CONSEQUENCES 134
(2005); see also Dorsey v. United States, 567 U.S. 260, 266 (2012) (“[The Anti-Drug Abuse Act
of 1986 ] sets forth mandatory minimum penalties of 5 and 10 years applicable to a drug offender
depending primarily upon the kind and amount of drugs involved in the offense.”); Kimbrough v.
United States, 552 U.S. 85, 95–97, 99 (2017) (“The 1986 [Anti-Drug Abuse Act] created a twotiered scheme of five- and ten-year mandatory minimum sentences for drug manufacturing and
distribution offenses.”).
124. See United States v. Wirsing, 943 F.3d 175, 177 (4th Cir. 2019) (“The disparity between
crack and powder cocaine originated in a statute enacted two years later: the Anti-Drug Abuse Act
of 1986.”).
125. COCAINE AND FEDERAL SENT’G POL’Y 1–2 (U.S. SENT’G COMM’N 1995).
126. FED. BUREAU PRISONS, supra note 86 (showing 24,640 inmates in 1984 and 210,227 inmates in 2010).
127. See LYNCH, HARD BARGAINS, supra note 79, at 60; see also Lynch, Booker
Circumvention?, supra note 121, at 60 (arguing that by the late 1990s, Congress had “severely
constrained judicial discretion . . . and sought to limit prosecutors’ discretion in plea bargaining”);
KATE STITH & JOSE A. CABRANES, FEAR OF JUDGING: SENTENCING GUIDELINES IN FEDERAL
COURTS 142 (1998) (“The problem, in sum, is not that prosecutors have discretion, or that the
exercise of that discretion inevitably results in sentencing ‘disparities’—that is obviously true, and
obviously unavoidable. The problem is that judges—the impartial arbiters under our constitutional
order—have now been denied countervailing discretionary authority to restrain prosecutorial
power.”); TONRY, supra note 118, at 156 (arguing that the sentencing guidelines have failed and
must be reimagined).
128. See United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 258 (2005) (finding the provision of the federal
sentencing statute that makes the Guidelines mandatory would be incompatible with today's
constitutional holding); Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 46–51 (2007) (noting that after Booker,
the Guidelines are advisory, not mandatory); Kimbrough v. United States, 552 U.S. 85, 90 (2007)
(“This Court's remedial opinion in United States v. Booker instructed district courts to read the
United States Sentencing Guidelines as ‘effectively advisory’ . . . . [T]he Guidelines, formerly
mandatory, now serve as one factor among several courts must consider in determining an
appropriate sentence.”).
129. Booker, 543 U.S. at 227.
130. Id.
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that Mr. Booker possessed an additional 566 grams of crack.131 Given
that quantity, the sentencing guidelines required the judge to impose a
360 months to life sentence.132 In a two-part opinion, the Supreme Court
explained that the jury’s verdict did not authorize the longer sentence, but
the judge would be reversed if he did not impose it.133 As a result, the
mandatory guidelines provision of the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984
violated the Sixth Amendment134 and must be severed.135
In Gall, the Eighth Circuit reversed a probation sentence on the
grounds that the sentencing judge had failed to show extraordinary
circumstances permitting a variance below the 30-month bottom of the
guidelines range.136 The Supreme Court reversed, reiterating Booker, and
holding that appellate courts must apply abuse-of-discretion review, not
a heightened standard of review, to sentences outside the Guidelines
range.137
In Kimbrough, the Supreme Court held that the sentencing court had
not abused its discretion in finding that the sentencing guidelines’ “100to-1 [crack-to-powder cocaine] ratio itself created an unwarranted
disparity within the meaning of § 3553(a).”138
The Supreme Court’s sentencing guidelines rulings restored some
judicial discretion but did not alter the guidelines themselves or statutory
mandatory minimums, including harsh crack penalties under § 841(b).139
Post-Booker, the federal prison population continued to grow.140
In 2007, the Sentencing Commission addressed the crack-to-powder
cocaine disparity by reducing the base offense levels for crack cocaine

131. Id.
132. Id.
133. Id. at 235.
134. Id. at 244; see also U.S. CONST. amend. VI (“In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall
enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the
crime shall have been committed . . . .”).
135. Booker, 543 U.S. at 258.
136. Gall, 552 U.S. at 45–46.
137. Id. at 50.
138. Kimbrough v. United States, 552 U.S. 85, 111 (2007).
139. See, e.g., 21 U.S.C. § 841(b) (imposing mandatory penalties for crack cocaine and related
offenses); see also DePierre v. United States, 564 U.S. 70, 89 (2011) (defining crack cocaine in
relation to other drugs for sentencing purposes).
140. LYNCH, HARD BARGAINS, supra note 79, at 6 (showing federal prison growth from 1970
to 2012); see the special section on prison reduction in volume 10, issue 4 of CRIMINOLOGY & PUB.
POL’Y 873, 909–37 (2011) (with essays by Megan Kurlychek, Susan Turner, and Faye S. Taxman).
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convictions.141 A year later, the Sentencing Commission made the
change retroactive.142 Then Congress got involved.
In 2010, Congress passed the Fair Sentencing Act.143 The Act
“alleviate[d] the severe sentencing disparity between crack and powder
cocaine [by] reduc[ing] the statutory penalties for cocaine base
offenses.”144 The law’s second section increased the crack cocaine
quantities necessary to trigger mandatory minimum sentences under the
Controlled Substances Act and Controlled Substances Import and Export
Act.145 The Fair Sentencing Act affected defendants sentenced in late
2010 or after.
Following the Act, the Sentencing Commission further adjusted crack
cocaine offense levels and made that change retroactive.146 “As a result
of the 2007 and 2010 [remedies], courts reduced the sentences of
approximately 24,181 individuals collectively.”147 But the changes did
not help certain defendants sentenced to mandatory statutory minimums
prior to 2010.148 The First Step Act of 2018 offered relief to those
defendants.149
The central aim of the Formerly Incarcerated Reenter Society
Transformed Safely Transitioning Every Person (First Step) Act, as the
141. See Devins, supra note 62, at 45 (“In 2007, the Sentencing Commission reduced the base
offense levels for crack cocaine offenses”); see also United States v. Wirsing, 943 F.3d 175, 177
(4th Cir. 2019) (“[B]etween 1995 and 2007, the United States Sentencing Commission issued four
reports to Congress advising that ‘the ratio was too high and unjustified.’ First, ‘research showed
the relative harm between crack and powder cocaine [was] less severe than 100 to 1.’ In fact, ‘[t]he
active ingredient in powder and crack cocaine is the same’; the difference is in how the drugs are
ingested, with crack ‘produc[ing] a shorter, more intense high.’”) (internal citations omitted).
142. See Devins, supra note 62, at 45 (“In March 2008, the Commission applied th[e] change
retroactively.”) (citing U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL 2011).
143. Fair Sentencing Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-220, 124 Stat. 2372; see Shon Hopwood,
The Effort to Reform the Federal Criminal Justice System, YALE L.J. F. 791, 793 (2019) (noting
the growing bipartisan agreement that the sentencing system needed reform and Congress’s slow
path toward that reform, and characterizing the Fair Sentencing Act as an “incredibly modest sentencing reform”).
144. United States v. Peters, 843 F.3d 572, 575 (4th Cir. 2016).
145. See Fair Sentencing Act of 2010 § 2 (“COCAINE SENTENCING DISPARITY
REDUCTION. (a) . . . Section 401(b)(1) of the Controlled Substances Act (21 U.S.C. 841(b)(1)) is
amended . . . (1) in subparagraph (A)(iii), by striking ‘50 grams’ and inserting ‘280 grams’; and . . .
(2) in subparagraph (B)(iii), by striking ‘5 grams’ and inserting ‘28 grams’. (b) . . . Section 1010(b)
of the Controlled Substances Import and Export Act (21 U.S.C. 960(b)) is amended.”).
146. Devins, supra note 62, at 45.
147. Id.
148. See, e.g., United States v. Wirsing, 943 F.3d 175, 179 (4th Cir. 2019) (“Against this background, Congress enacted the First Step Act in December 2018. The First Step Act filled some gaps
left by the Fair Sentencing Act. For example, before the First Step Act, the defendant in Dean could
not access the benefits of the Fair Sentencing Act: he was sentenced in June 2010, shortly before
the Fair Sentencing Act’s enactment, and he was ineligible for relief under Amendment 782.”).
149. See 164 CONG. REC. S7774 (daily ed. Dec. 18, 2018) (statement of Sen. Feinstein) (explaining that The First Step Act of 2018 made “the Fair Sentencing Act retroactive”).
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title suggests, was to enhance prison-based anti-recidivism programming
and to expand early release opportunities (e.g., good time credits).150
Still, the bill reflected a broader consensus that (1) Congress had created
unjustly harsh sentences for certain crimes,151 (2) the mid-1980s
sentencing regime had resulted in untenable prison growth and
crowding,152 (3) too much of the federal justice budget was being spent
on prisons (e.g., versus law enforcement),153 and (4) rehabilitation was a
social good and appropriate aim of the federal justice system.154
150. See 164 CONG. REC. S7641–42 (daily ed. Dec. 17, 2018) (statement of Sen. Cornyn) (discussing how Texas reduced its recidivism rate and advocating similar federal reform); 164 CONG.
REC. S7649 (daily ed. Dec. 17, 2018) (statement of Sen. Grassley) (“Recidivism rates are far too
high and drive crime rates up.”); 164 CONG. REC. S7739 (daily ed. Dec. 18, 2018) (statement of
Sen. Schumer) (lauding the bill for providing “those in prison [with] the kind of training and drug
treatment they need so that they can be successful and productive citizens when they get outside.”);
164 CONG. REC. S7769 (daily ed. Dec. 18, 2018) (statement of Sen. Portman) (“We have committed ourselves here in Congress to . . . try to reduce crimes, bring families back together, and help
people be able to live out their purpose in life.”).
151. See 164 CONG. REC. S7649 (daily ed. Dec. 17, 2018) (statement of Sen. Grassley) (“The
FIRST STEP Act . . . addresses overly harsh and expensive mandatory minimums for certain nonviolent offenders.”); 164 CONG. REC. S7745 (daily ed. Dec. 18, 2018) (statement of Sen. Blumenthal) (“These draconian prison terms provide few incentives for prisoners to prepare for reentry,
and that is the gap the FIRST STEP Act seeks to address.”); id. at S7747 (statement of Sen.
Klobuchar) (“The sentencing laws on low-level drug offenders were implemented decades ago . . . .
This has resulted in prison sentences that actually don’t fit the crime.”); id. at S7749 (statement of
Sen. Leahy) (“For far too long, the legislative response to any and all public safety concerns was
as simple as it was flawed: No matter the perceived ill, we turned to arbitrary and inflexible mandatory minimums to cure it. . . . It routinely results in low-level offenders spending far longer in
prison than either public safety or common sense requires.”).
152. See 164 CONG. REC. S7644 (daily ed. Dec. 17, 2018) (statement of Sen. Durbin) (“America
has 5 percent of the world’s population, 25 percent of the world’s prisoners—more than Russia or
China.”); id. at S7646 (statement of Sen. Jones) (arguing that the “system of justice . . . has incarcerated so many people—more than just about any civilized country in the world—and yields very
little results”); 164 CONG. REC. S7762 (daily ed. Dec. 18, 2018) (statement of Sen. Booker) (“Since
1980 alone, our Federal prison population has exploded by 800 percent . . . . [t]his is because of
failed policies by this body”).
153. See 164 CONG. REC. S7644 (daily ed. Dec. 17, 2018) (statement of Sen. Durbin) (“Federal
prison spending has increased by nearly 600 percent [since 1980] . . . . Our overcrowded Federal
prisons consume one-quarter of the Justice Department’s discretionary budget. This undermines
other important priorities, like preventing crime in our neighborhoods and treating drug addiction.”); id. at S7649 (statement of Sen. Grassley) (“Locking up low-level offenders for needlessly
long prison sentences diverts resources that are needed elsewhere to fight crime.”); 164 CONG. REC.
S7744 (daily ed. Dec. 18, 2018) (statement of Sen. Blumenthal) (“The Federal Government currently spends billions every year maintaining our prison population—the largest in the world. If we
really want to keep people safe, there should be more dedication of resources to State and local
enforcement, who patrol our streets, keep our communities safe, and provide role models for many
of our young people.”).
154. See 164 CONG. REC. S7769 (daily ed. Dec. 18, 2018) (statement of Sen. Portman) (“We
believe in redemption in this country. . . . Let’s do something about it. Let’s not hold people back
because of their mistakes in the past but, instead, give them the tools to be able to lead a better life,
a more productive life.”); cf. Id. at (statement of Sen. Kennedy) (“Justice exists when people receive
what they deserve, and that is what the American criminal justice system is about. It is not supposed
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Prison reform was the sole focus of early versions of the First Step
Act.155 However, sponsors could not get the votes they needed without
sentencing reform.156 So, “Democrats and Republicans . . . worked it
out”157 and produced a combined prison/sentencing reform act. In early
2019, the First Step Act, particularly section 404, launched the federal
courts into uncharted territory.
IV. UNRESOLVED ISSUES IN SECTION 404 CASES
Section 404 of the First Step Act is four sentences long. It reads:
(a) Definition of Covered Offense.—In this section, the term “covered
offense’” means a violation of a Federal criminal statute, the statutory
penalties for which were modified by section 2 or 3 of the Fair
Sentencing Act of 2010, that was committed before August 3, 2010.
(b) Defendants Previously Sentenced.—A court that imposed a
sentence for a covered offense may, on motion of the defendant, the
Director of the Bureau of Prisons, the attorney for the Government, or
the court, impose a reduced sentence as if sections 2 and 3 of the Fair
Sentencing Act of 2010 were in effect at the time the covered offense
was committed.
(c) Limitations.—No court shall entertain a motion made under this
section to reduce a sentence if the sentence was previously imposed or
previously reduced in accordance with the amendments made by
sections 2 and 3 of the Fair Sentencing Act of 2010 or if a previous
motion made under this section to reduce the sentence was, after the
to be primarily about deterrence and rehabilitation, though those are important goals. The ultimate
goal is justice. That is why I think this bill is backward.”).
155. See H.R. REP. No. 115-699, at 22 (2018) (“H.R. 5682 will enhance public safety by improving the effectiveness and efficiency of the Federal prison system . . . . It also makes various
changes to Bureau of Prisons’ policies and procedures to ensure prisoner and guard safety and
security.”).
156. See 164 CONG. REC. H4311 (daily ed. May 22, 2018) (statement of Rep. Goodlatte) (“I
know there are some in this body who are opposing this legislation because it does not include
sentencing reform.”); id. (statement of Rep. Nadler) (“Nor do I believe more balanced reform is not
viable when Senator Chuck Grassley, the chairman of the Senate Judiciary Committee, told us:
‘For any criminal justice system proposal to win approval in the Senate, it must include . . . sentencing reforms.’”); 164 CONG. REC. S7645 (daily ed. Dec. 17, 2018) (statement of Sen. Durbin)
(“I didn’t like the original version of this bill because I thought we could do better and we should
add criminal sentencing to prison reform.”); see also Letter from the Leadership Conference on
Civil and Human Rights to House of Representatives (May 21, 2018), as reprinted in 164 CONG.
REC. H4316 (daily ed. May 21, 2018) (“[W]e write to urge you to vote NO on The FIRST STEP
Act (H.R.5682). While well intentioned, this bill takes a misguided approach to reforming our federal justice system.”)
157. See 164 CONG. REC. S7645 (daily ed. Dec. 17, 2018) (statement of Sen. Durbin) (“We sat
down, Democrats and Republicans, and worked it out.”); see Hopwood, supra note 143, at 794–95
(“Between 2015 and 2018, Congress could not pass the Sentencing Reform and Corrections Act,
which stalled in the Senate. And many other reforms died on the vine after being introduced in
Senate and House committees. But then, almost miraculously, Congress passed a federal prison and
sentencing reform bill called the First Step Act in December 2018.”).
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date of enactment of this Act, denied after a complete review of the
motion on the merits. Nothing in this section shall be construed to
require a court to reduce any sentence pursuant to this section.158

Despite the brevity of the text, judges must navigate four complex
issues in implementing section 404 sentence reductions. First, who is
eligible for resentencing. Second, whether judges may engage in plenary
resentencing or merely sentence reduction. Third, whether judges may
resentence all concurrent criminal convictions or only crack cocaine
convictions. And finally, whether judges must adopt the operative drug
quantity (or quantities) from the original sentencing.
A. Eligibility for First Step Act Review
The first question courts have had to grapple with is whether Congress
intended a broad, categorical approach to section 404 eligibility or a
narrow offense-conduct approach.
To obtain a section 404 review, a defendant must demonstrate that he
or she was sentenced on a “covered offense,” or “a violation of a Federal
criminal statute, the statutory penalties for which were modified by
section 2 or 3 of the Fair Sentencing Act of 2010.”159 The majority view
of eligibility,160 as summarized by the U.S. Sentencing Commission, is
that “[a]ny defendant sentenced for a crack cocaine offense before the
effective date of the Fair Sentencing Act of 2010 who did not receive the
benefit of the statutory penalty changes made by that Act is eligible for a
sentence reduction under the First Step Act.”161
Or, as Judge Jonker explained, “eligibility under the language of the
First Step Act turns on a simple, categorical question: namely, whether a
defendant’s offense of conviction was a crack cocaine offense affected
by the Fair Sentencing Act. If so, the defendant is categorically eligible
for consideration . . . .”162 Under this view, the statutes of conviction
158. First Step Act of 2018, Pub. L. No. 115-391, § 404, 132 Stat. 5222 (internal citations omitted).
159. Id. at § 404(a).
160. See, e.g., United States v. Wirsing, 943 F.3d at 175, 179 (4th Cir. 2019) (“The First Step
Act filled some gaps left by the Fair Sentencing Act.”); United States v. Pierre, 372 F. Supp. 3d 17,
18 (D.R.I. 2019) (“Section 404 of the [First Step] Act provides that a district court may ‘impose a
reduced sentence as if sections 2 and 3 of the Fair Sentencing Act of 2010 were in effect at the time
the covered offense was committed.’”); United States v. Simons, 375 F. Supp. 3d 379, 381
(E.D.N.Y. 2019) (“The [First Step] Act permits courts to retroactively lower the sentence of a defendant convicted of certain Controlled Substances Act violations involving crack cocaine.”).
161. ESP INSIDER EXPRESS, supra note 76, at 7 (answering “[w]ho is eligible for a sentence
reduction based retroactive application of the Fair Sentencing Act of 2010”).
162. See United States v. Boulding, 379 F. Supp. 3d 646, 651–52 (W.D. Mich. 2019) (“Quantity
is simply not part of the statutory test for eligibility under the First Step Act. Eligibility turns entirely on the categorical nature of the prior conviction. All other issues, including the proper

90

Loyola University Chicago Law Journal

[Vol. 52

control eligibility.
By contrast, the minority view holds that the offense conduct,
particularly the drug quantity, controls eligibility.163 At least two
arguments support this view. First, Congress defined “covered offense”
as “violation of a Federal criminal statute”, and “violation” typically
refers to “criminal conduct.”164 Second, Congress intended “statutory
penalties” to modify “violation”165 or the criminal conduct.
Judges have rejected this narrower reading of eligibility on at least
three grounds. First, they find the offense-conduct view unsupported by
the text and broader context of section 404.166 For instance, they point to
the close proximity of the phrase “[f]ederal criminal statute” to “were
modified by . . . the Fair Sentencing Act of 2010.”167 This proximity
recommends a categorical approach to eligibility according to judges in
the majority. Second, some find the offense-conduct approach contrary
to congressional intent. These judges find that the Act’s remedial purpose
and history require a broad threshold inquiry into defendant eligibility.168
Third, others contend that “the ‘weight of persuasive authority’ supports
reading section 404(a) and determining eligibility by reference to the
statute underlying a defendant’s conviction and penalty.”169
In addition to these arguments, pre-passage eligibility estimates and
post-passage Sentencing Commission data suggest that Congress
intended to create a categorical approach to eligibility. Prior to the
passage of the First Step Act, Senator Cotton and the Marshall Project170
quantity determination, are a part of a reviewing court’s discretionary call on whether to modify an
eligible defendant’s sentence.”); see also Devins, supra note 62, at 102 (discussing due process
arguments for the categorical approach in resentencing cases following Johnson v. United States
and Sentencing Commission Amendment 782).
163. See, e.g., United States v. Blocker, 378 F. Supp. 3d at 1125, 1129 (N.D. Fla. 2019) (“The
statute thus adopts the offense-controls theory, not the indictment-controls theory. On the government’s view of the facts, Mr. Blocker’s crimes are not ‘covered offenses.’ If those are the actual
facts, the First Step Act does not authorize a sentence reduction.”).
164. Id.
165. See United States v. White, F. Supp. 3d 15, 32 (D.D.C. 2019) (“The government grounds
this drug-quantity-driven eligibility theory in the text of Section 404(a), explaining that ‘the eligibility inquiry’ depends on whether the statutory penalties for the ‘violation’ that the defendant committed were modified by the FSA.”).
166. Id. at 33 (“The government’s multi-layered construction of the ‘covered offense’ definition
in Section 404(a) is inconsistent with both the statutory text and normal canons of statutory interpretation.”).
167. Id.
168. Id. (“In this regard, the government’s drug quantity approach ‘misreads the text of the First
Step Act, undermines the purpose of the Act, and is inconsistent with the decisions of the vast
majority of courts that have decided this issue.”) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
169. Id. at 38 (internal citation omitted).
170. The Marshall Project is a nonprofit news organization focused on criminal justice reporting
and reform. See THE MARSHALL PROJECT, https://www.themarshallproject.org/
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separately estimated that a few thousand federal inmates would be
eligible for section 404 relief.171 In January 2020, the Sentencing
Commission reported that judges had granted nearly 2,000 motions for
First Step Act reconsideration.172 This pre-Act, post-Act data alignment
suggests that the moving defendants are likely eligible for
reconsideration.
Thus, stronger evidence suggests that Congress intended a categorical—not offense-conduct—approach to section 404 eligibility.173 The
circuit courts have largely adopted this view.
As of late May 2020, seven circuits have adopted a categorical
approach to section 404 eligibility.174 Several unpublished opinions
[https://perma.cc/YB4Y-LLNM] (last visited Aug. 27, 2020); see also Justin George, What’s Really
in the First Step Act?, THE MARSHALL PROJECT (Nov. 16, 2018, 12:45 PM), https://www.themarshallproject.org/2018/11/16/what-s-really-in-the-first-step-act [https://perma.cc/9TLZ-LGLL].
171. Salvador Rizzo, Does the Sentencing Bill Give Early Release to Drug Traffickers, Sex
Offenders?, WASH. POST, (Nov. 30, 2018, 2:00 AM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2018/11/30/does-sentencing-bill-give-early-release-drug-traffickers-sex-offenders/
[https://perma.cc/4G5J-PDLJ]; see also United States v. Hayes, 555 U.S. 415, 429 (2009) (“The
remarks of a single Senator are ‘not controlling,’ but, as Hayes recognizes, the legislative record is
otherwise ‘absolutely silent.’”) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
172. U.S. SENT’G COMM’N, FIRST STEP ACT OF 2018 RESENTENCING PROVISIONS
RETROACTIVITY DATA REPORT 4 (2020) (“[There were] 2,387 cases in which the court granted a
motion for a sentence reduction due to Section 404 of the First Step Act of 2018”).
173. See United States v. Williams, 402 F. Supp. 3d 442, 448 (N.D. Ill. 2019) (“In the end, then,
the straightforward reading of ‘offense’ is that it refers to the offense of conviction, not the defendant’s related conduct. To the extent that there is ambiguity, the rule of lenity would kick in and
require an interpretation in favor of the defendant.”).
174. United States v. Smith, 954 F.3d 446, 448–51 (1st Cir. 2020) (adopting the categorical
approach followed by other circuits and extending categorical eligibility to § 841(b)(1)(C) convictions); United States v. Holloway, 956 F.3d 660, 664 (2d Cir. 2020) (“To be eligible, then, Holloway was required to demonstrate that he was sentenced for a particular ‘violation of a Federal
criminal statute,’ and that the applicable statutory penalties for that violation were modified by the
specified provisions of the Fair Sentencing Act.”); United States v. Wirsing, 943 F.3d 175, 186 (4th
Cir. 2019) (“All defendants who are serving sentences for violations of 21 U.S.C.
§ 841(b)(1)(A)(iii) and (B)(iii), and who are not excluded pursuant to the expressed limitations in
Section 404(c) of the First Step Act, are eligible to move for relief under that Act”); see also United
States v. Gravatt, 953 F.3d 258, 263–64 (4th Cir. 2020) (remanding for consideration of a hybrid
case involving crack and powder cocaine convictions because the crack conviction opened the door
for First Step Act resentencing); United States v. Jackson, 945 F.3d 315, 320–21 (5th Cir. 2019),
cert. denied, No. 19-8036, 2020 WL 1906710 (U.S. Apr. 20, 2020) (“Jackson has a covered offense.
He meets all the requirements of section 404(a): He was convicted of violating a statute whose
penalties the Fair Sentencing Act modified, and the violation occurred ‘before August 3, 2010.’ He
also doesn’t transgress the ‘limitations’ of section 404(c) . . . . He is thus eligible for resentencing.”); United States v. Beamus, 943 F.3d 789, 791 (6th Cir. 2019) (“By its terms, the First Step
Act permits Beamus to seek resentencing. He was convicted of an offense for which the Fair Sentencing Act modified the statutory penalty, and he has not received a reduction in accordance with
that Act or lost such a motion on the merits.”); United States v. Shaw, 957 F.3d 734, 735 (7th Cir.
2020) (“To determine whether a defendant is eligible for a reduced sentence under the First Step
Act, a court needs to look only at a defendant’s statute of conviction, not to the quantities of crack
involved in the offense.”); United States v. McDonald, 944 F.3d 769, 772 (8th Cir. 2019) (“The
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suggest that additional circuits will follow suit when the issue is properly
before them.175 Even if a uniform doctrine emerges, however, eligibility
for convictions under § 841(b)(1)(C),176 hybrid convictions (e.g., cocaine
base and heroin) and post-release prison sentence reductions remain gray
areas.177
B. Sentence Reduction or Plenary Resentencing
The second question courts have had to grapple with is whether the
First Step Act vests judges with narrow sentence reduction authority or
broad plenary resentencing authority.
Section 404(b) states that “[a] court . . . may . . . impose a reduced
sentence as if sections 2 and 3 of the Fair Sentencing Act of 2010 . . .
First Step Act applies to offenses, not conduct, and it is McDonald’s statute of conviction that
determines his eligibility for relief”) (internal citation omitted).
175. United States v. Hardwick, 802 F. App’x 707, 709–10 (3d Cir. 2020) (per curiam) (“Although a life sentence was statutorily authorized when the District Court sentenced Hardwick, the
Fair Sentencing Act has since reduced the statutory penalty for crack cocaine offenses like his to a
term of five to 40 years. Hardwick’s motion under the First Step Act required the District Court to
assess his request for a sentence reduction in light of that change to the statutory scheme.” (citing
Beamus, 943 F.3d at 791-92; Wirsing, 943 F.3d at 185; McDonald, 944 F.3d at 772)); United States
v. Whittaker, 777 F. App’x 938, 940 (10th Cir. 2019) (“The First Step Act of 2018, Pub. L. 115391, 132 Stat. 5194, permits a district court to reduce a sentence based on the lower statutory sentencing ranges of the Fair Sentencing Act of 2010, Pub. L. 111-220, 124 Stat. 2372. But it applies
only to defendants who were sentenced for crack cocaine offenses committed before August 3,
2010.”); cf. United States v. Martinez, 777 F. App’x 946, 947 (10th Cir. 2019) (“Martinez, however,
was convicted of violating 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(C), a statutory provision that criminalizes possession with intent to distribute crack cocaine, irrespective of quantity. The Fair Sentencing Act
had no effect on § 841(b)(1)(C) and, thus, Martinez’s crime of conviction is not a ‘covered offense’
under the Act.”); United States v. Lahens, 805 F. App’x 864, 865 (11th Cir. 2020) (per curiam)
(“The parties here do not dispute that Lahens is statutorily eligible for a sentence reduction under
the First Step Act. That is, they appear to agree that: (1) Lahens was convicted of a ‘covered offense’; (2) had the Fair Sentencing Act been in effect at the time of his conviction, he would have
been subject to a lower statutory maximum and no mandatory minimum; and (3) because of the
lower statutory maximum, he would have been subject to lower guideline range, even as a career
offender.”).
176. Smith, 954 F.3d at 451 (“Congress intended to provide potential relief to persons like Smith
whose penalties were dictated by § 841(b)(1)(C) and therefore were only indirectly affected by the
minimum sentences called for by § 841(b)(1)(A)(iii) and § 841(b)(1)(B)(iii).”).
177. See infra Section IV.C., for a discussion about hybrid convictions. See United States v.
Venable, 943 F.3d 187, 195 (4th Cir. 2019) (“[W]e hold that the district court erred in concluding
the First Step Act did not authorize it to provide relief to Venable because he had finished serving
his original term of imprisonment and was currently serving a term of imprisonment for revocation
of supervised release.”); United States v. Hanzy, 802 F. App’x 850, 851 (5th Cir. 2020) (“Because
Hanzy completed his federal term of imprisonment, he is ineligible for a reduction in his term of
imprisonment.”); United States v. Woods, 949 F.3d 934, 937 (6th Cir. 2020) (“Given that Woods’s
current 37-month sentence relates to his original offense under 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1)—a First Step
Act ‘covered offense’—Woods is eligible for resentencing . . . . The district court did not find
Woods ineligible under the First Step Act due to the fact Woods is currently serving a postrevocation sentence. Rather, the district court assumed eligibility and considered factors that weighed in
favor or against granting a sentence reduction. And it treated Woods’s violation conduct as one
factor in the analysis, not an independent and dispositive reason for denying a reduction.”).
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were in effect at the time the covered offense was committed.”178 Under
the majority view,179 section 404(b) permits resentencing judges to
reduce the sentences for certain crack cocaine offenses. Beyond that
reduction, judges are not permitted to engage in plenary resentencing. 180
For instance, judges may not disturb enhancements (e.g., for leadership
roles).181 At least five arguments support the sentence-reduction view.
First, section 404 merely made the Fair Sentencing Act retroactive.
Both 404(a) and (b) refer to “section 2 or 3 of the Fair Sentencing Act of
2010.”182 The majority of courts “read . . . these two provisions [as]
discretion to reduce the defendant’s sentence on the covered offenses—
the drug counts—to the sentence he would have received if section 2 [or
3] of the FSA had been in effect when he committed the drug
offenses.”183 Accordingly, some courts have declined to resentence
defendants on powder cocaine or weapons charges because those charges
were not affected by the Fair Sentencing Act.184
178. First Step Act of 2018, Pub. L. No. 115-391, § 404(b), 132 Stat. 5222 (2018).
179. See United States v. Sampson, 360 F. Supp. 3d 168, 171 (W.D.N.Y. 2019) (collecting cases
where the courts adopted the majority approach by reducing defendants’ sentences); United States
v. White, F. Supp. 3d 15, 40 (D.D.C. 2019) (“Moreover, Section 404 appears in ‘Title IV’ of the
First Step Act, titled ‘Sentencing Reform,’ and that Title’s provisions demonstrate Congress’s intention to maintain the finality of sentences already imposed. . . . Accordingly, this Court rejects
the defendants’ claim that Section 404 created a ‘freestanding remedy that authorizes the district
court to impose a reduced sentence for a covered offense,’ independent of § 3582(c), since that
position fails to grapple with the statutory text of both § 3582(c) and the First Step Act that compel
the contrary conclusion.”) (citations omitted).
180. See generally Pepper v. United States, 562 U.S. 476, 490 (2011) (“In light of the federal
sentencing framework described above, we think it clear that when a defendant’s sentence has been
set aside on appeal and his case remanded for resentencing, a district court may consider evidence
of a defendant’s rehabilitation since his prior sentencing and that such evidence may, in appropriate
cases, support a downward variance from the advisory Guidelines range.”).
181. A gray area exists in the majority view: whether judges may consider the full range of
§ 3553 factors, including rehabilitative conduct, during mere sentence reductions.
182. First Step Act of 2018, Pub. L. No. 115-391, § 404(a)–(b), 132 Stat. 5222 (2018).
183. United States v. Rivas, No. 04-cr-256, 2019 WL 1746392, at *6 (E.D. Wis. Apr. 18, 2019)
(emphasis omitted). See also United States v. Carter, 792 F. App’x 660, 663 (11th Cir. 2019) (“Congress has expressly permitted courts to retroactively apply only the Fair Sentencing Act to defendants who qualify, while otherwise considering their sentence against the backdrop of the legal landscape at the time of their offense.”); United States v. Hegwood, 934 F.3d 414, 418 (5th Cir. 2019)
(“The calculations that had earlier been made under the Sentencing Guidelines are adjusted ‘as if’
the lower drug offense sentences were in effect at the time of the commission of the offense. That
is the only explicit basis stated for a change in the sentencing. In statutory construction, the expression of one thing generally excludes another.”).
184. See United States v. Burke, No. 08-CR-63(1), 2019 WL 2863403, at *4 (E.D. Tenn. July
2, 2019) (“As such, this Court does not have jurisdiction to reduce a firearms sentence under the
First Step Act.”); United States v. Mainor, No. 06-cr-140-1, 2019 WL 3425063, at *3 (E.D. Pa.
July 30, 2019) (“Thus, Mainor’s twenty-year sentence on the powder cocaine charges is ineligible
to be reduced under the First Step Act. And because the twenty-year powder cocaine sentence is to
run concurrently with the ten-year crack sentence, even if the Court were to reduce Mainor’s
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Second, plenary resentencing is prohibited by 18 U.S.C. § 3582.
Section 3582 anticipates three resentencing circumstances: (1) casespecific, extraordinary, and compelling reasons or advanced age and at
least thirty years of time served; (2) statutory changes or changes to
Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 35; or (3) lowering of the sentencing
guidelines.185 Most judges agree that First Step Act cases fall under the
statutory change category, codified at § 3582(c)(1)(B).186 That
subsection authorizes resentencing courts to “modify an imposed term of
imprisonment to the extent otherwise expressly permitted by statute or by
Rule 35.”187 In other words, subsection (c)(1)(B) directs courts back to
the First Step Act to determine their authority.188 The analysis then turns
on whether the Act expressly permits plenary resentencing. The majority
of judges finds no express authorizing language in the Act.189 As a result,
they determine that courts are prohibited under subsection (c)(1)(B) from
conducting plenary resentencing in First Step Act cases.
Third, legislative history supports the majority view. On the day of the
Act’s passage, Senator Feinstein stated that the First Step Act “fixes . . .
and finally makes the Fair Sentencing Act retroactive so that people
sentence on the crack conviction, it would not affect his total time of his incarceration, which would
still be twenty years.”).
185. 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c).
186. See United States v. Wirsing, 943 F.3d 175, 185 (4th Cir. 2019) (“However, the distinct
language of the First Step Act compels the interpretation that motions for relief under that statute
are appropriately brought under § 3582(c)(1)(B).”); United States v. Davis, 423 F. Supp. 3d 13, 16
(W.D.N.Y. 2019) (finding that 18 U.S.C. § 3582 (c)(1)(B) controls but plenary resentencing is not
authorized).
187. 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(B).
188. See United States v. Rose, 379 F. Supp. 3d 223, 232 (S.D.N.Y. 2019) (“[Section]
3582(c)(1)(B) merely redirects courts to Rule 35 and any other sources of authority that may exist,
without providing any substantive standard of its own. Section 3582(c)(1)(B) is, therefore, not itself
a source of authority for sentence modifications, nor does it delineate the scope of what the district
court should consider when resentencing is authorized by another provision” (citations omitted);
cf. United States v. Glover, 377 F. Supp. 3d 1346, 1355–56 (S.D. Fla. 2019) (holding that First Step
Act merely authorizes a sentence reduction and 3582(c)(1)(B) does not permit additional arguments
such as constitutional challenges).
189. See Glover, 377 F. Supp. 3d at 1357 (“[The Act] does not allow for a full de novo
resentencing”); United States v. Sampson, 360 F. Supp. 3d 168, 171 (W.D.N.Y. 2019) (“Nowhere
does the Act expressly permit [a] plenary resentencing or sentencing anew . . . .”) (quoting Davis,
423 F. Supp. 3d at 16); United States v. Crews, 385 F. Supp. 3d 439, 444–45 (W.D. Pa. 2019) (“As
Crews argues, this court is ‘not free to add words to a statute that Congress did not include in the
statute it enacted.’ This court, therefore, cannot conduct a plenary resentencing under the First Step
Act because the First Step Act specifically provides that the sentencing is limited to imposing a
reduced sentence ‘as if sections 2 and 3 of the Fair Sentencing Act’ were in effect when the
defendant committed the offense.”) (emphasis omitted) (citation omitted); United States v. Rivas,
No. 04-cr-256, 2019 WL 1746392, at *6 (E.D. Wis. Apr. 18, 2019) (“The First Step Act does not
‘expressly permit’ the court to conduct a plenary resentencing.”); cf. United States v. Allen, 384 F.
Supp. 3d 238, 243 (D. Conn. 2019) (“This question need not be resolved here because Mr. Allen is
entitled to immediate release based on the Fair Sentencing Act’s modification of the statutory
maximum penalty applicable to his offense.”).
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sentenced under the old standard can ask to be resentenced under the new
one.”190 Senator Cardin also explained that the First Step Act, “makes
retroactive the application of the Fair Sentencing Act, in which Congress
addressed the crack-powder sentencing disparity, and allows individuals
affected by this disparity to petition for sentence reductions.”191 Such
statements support a narrow reading of judicial authority under the Act.
Fourth, longstanding precedent recommends sentence reduction rather
than the creation of a new sentence.192 Typically, once a criminal
sentence has been upheld on direct review, the judgment is considered
final.193 This “rule of finality” reflects the high cost of litigation, the
public’s need for reliable justice,194 and the parties’ need for certainty.195
Section 3582 provides narrow exceptions to the rule of finality.196 And,
the Supreme Court recognizes exceptions for new substantive rules of
offense conduct or covered offenders197 and new procedures,
“implicating the fundamental fairness and accuracy of the criminal
proceeding.”198 But, such exceptions remain limited.199

190. 164 CONG. REC. S7774 (daily ed. Dec. 18, 2018) (statement of Sen. Feinstein).
191. Id. (statement of Sen. Cardin).
192. See Ryan W. Scott, In Defense of the Finality of Criminal Sentences on Collateral Review,
4 WAKE FOREST JL. & POL’Y 179, 185 (2014) (“According to the prevailing view, championed in
influential opinions and articles by Justice John Marshall Harlan, Judge Henry Friendly, and scholars like Paul Bator, Anthony Amsterdam, and Paul Mishkin, the government has a strong interest
in preserving . . . a [final] judgment”).
193. Id.; see also Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 310 (1989) (“[W]e now adopt Justice Harlan’s
view of retroactivity for cases on collateral review. Unless they fall within an exception to the
general rule, new constitutional rules of criminal procedure will not be applicable to those cases
which have become final before the new rules are announced.”).
194. See Scott, supra note 192, at 185 (concluding that a strong interest in preserving a final
judgment is grounded in three practical considerations: the costs of re-litigation, the accuracy of
new proceedings, and the damage to the reputation of the criminal justice system).
195. See Mackey v. United States, 401 U.S. 667, 690–91 (1971) (Harlan, J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part) (“Finality in the criminal law is an end which must always be kept in plain
view. . . . If law, criminal or otherwise, is worth having and enforcing, it must at some time provide
a definitive answer to the questions litigants present or else it never provides an answer at all. . . .
No one, not criminal defendants, not the judicial system, not society as a whole is benefited by a
judgment providing a man shall tentatively go to jail today, but tomorrow and every day thereafter
his continued incarceration shall be subject to fresh litigation on issues already resolved.”).
196. See Dillon v. United States, 560 U.S. 817, 827 (2010) (discussing the rule of finality in the
§ 3582(c)(2) context).
197. See Welch v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 1257, 1264 (2016) (“Teague and its progeny recognize two categories of decisions that fall outside this general bar on retroactivity for procedural
rules. First, ‘[n]ew substantive rules generally apply retroactively.’ Second, new ‘watershed rules
of criminal procedure,’ which are procedural rules ‘implicating the fundamental fairness and accuracy of the criminal proceeding,’ will also have retroactive effect.”) (citations omitted).
198. Id. (quoting Saffle v. Parks, 494 U.S. 484, 495 (1990)).
199. See Devins, supra note 62, at 41(“The general bar on retroactivity, with its limited exceptions, intends to balance the purposes of collateral review against the interest in finality of criminal
convictions.”).
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Fifth, collegiality mitigates against plenary resentencing. As a rule, a
lone trial judge makes factual findings and enters a criminal sentence,
which his or her peers respect.200 Such collegiality, according to late
Third Circuit judge, Collins J. Seitz, contributes to intellectual
magnanimity and the image of the neutral judiciary. 201 First Step Act
cases test this norm. In many First Step Act cases,202 original sentencing
judges are no longer presiding. Their successors sometimes find no
compelling reason, such as a congressional mandate, to disturb their
predecessors’ factual findings in complex drug cases.203
A minority believes that section 404 authorizes resentencing judges to
engage in extended, holistic, or even tabula rasa204 resentencing. While
controversial, this plenary resentencing position is better supported by the
text and context of the First Step Act.
Under the minority view, section 404(b) permits judges to convene a
hearing with “all of the procedural trappings and collateral effects of the
original sentencing, including . . . arguments that are ‘unrelated to the
issue(s) that precipitated the rehearing, including any non-retroactive
changes in the law’; and . . . the defendant’s presence, unless waived.”205
At least seven arguments support this view; the first three are statutory
construction arguments.

200. See Reform of the Federal Criminal Laws: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Crim. L. &
Procedures of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 93d Cong., 6515 (1973) (The Ass’n of the Bar of the
City of New York Rep, on Sentencing Practices in the Fed. Courts in New York City) (discussing
older judges’ reluctance to sentencing panels in the context of individual sentencing and collegiality).
201. See Collins J. Seitz, Collegiality and the Court of Appeals, 75 JUDICATURE 26, 27 (1991)
(explaining that the effects of collegiality exist in general but also as between district judges and
their appellate reviewers).
202. See, e.g., United States v. Kramer, No. 87-cr-40070, 2019 WL 3322374, at *1 (S.D. Ill.
July 24, 2019) (containing a 1988 conviction); United States v. Eidson, No. 88-cr-00021, 2019 WL
3767570, at *1 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 9, 2019).
203. See, e.g., United States v. Rivas, No. 04-cr-256, 2019 WL 1746392, at *8 (E.D. Wis. Apr.
18, 2019) (“The First Step Act . . . . does not authorize the court to disturb the 120-month sentence
Judge Clevert imposed on Count One. It does not authorize the court to disturb Judge Clevert’s
conclusion that the defendant qualified as a career offender, or ignore the requirement that a court
must impose the five-year mandatory sentence required by § 924(c) to run consecutively to any
other sentence imposed.”).
204. See Tabula Rasa, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (7th ed. 1999) (defining tabula rasa as “a
blank tablet ready for writing; a clean slate.”).
205. United States v. Medina, No. 05-cr-58, 2019 WL 3769598, at *5 (D. Conn. July 17, 2019)
(quoting United States v. Rose, 379 F. Supp. 3d 223, 232 (S.D.N.Y. 2019)). See also Shabazz v.
United States, 923 F.3d 82, 84 (2d Cir. 2019) (“The Supreme Court explained that, upon a remand
for a plenary resentencing, a sentencing court must be allowed to consider the mandatory sentencing factors in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) as of the time of imposition of the new sentence, and, if appropriate, to grant a departure or variance based on the defendant’s conduct since the original sentencing.”).
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First, section 404(b),206 which states that, “[a] court . . . may . . .
impose a reduced sentence as if sections 2 and 3 of the Fair Sentencing
Act of 2010 were in effect . . .” 207 allows judges to impose any criminal
sentence with two limitations: (1) that the new sentence must be less than
the original sentence (“reduced”), and (2) that the new sentence must
comport with the Fair Sentencing Act of 2010.208
Second, the word “impose,” used twice in the one-sentence section,
refers to a past and future sentencing. Logically, “impose” has the same
meaning throughout the sentence and section.209 As a result, resentencing
judges have the same authority that original sentencing judges had:
plenary authority.210
Third, Congress typically uses “impose” to mean plenary
sentencing.211 For instance, § 3553 instructs judges to “impose a sentence
sufficient, but not greater than necessary.”212 Similarly, § 3661
announces that, “[n]o limitation shall be placed on the information
concerning the background, character, and conduct of a person convicted

206. See Consumer Prod. Safety Comm’n v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 447 U.S. 102, 108 (1980)
(“We begin with the familiar canon of statutory construction that the starting point for interpreting
a statute is the language of the statute itself.”); Barnhart v. Sigmon Coal Co., 534 U.S. 438, 450
(2002) (“The first step is to determine whether the language at issue has a plain and unambiguous
meaning with regard to the particular dispute in the case.”).
207. First Step Act of 2018, Pub. L. No. 115-391, § 404(b), 132 Stat. 5222 (2018).
208. Id. at § 404(c).
209. See Rose, 379 F. Supp. 3d at 234 (“Indeed, the single sentence that is § 404(b) uses the
verb ‘impose’ twice. The first part of § 404(b) is unequivocal that any motion for relief must be
considered by the ‘court that imposed a sentence for a covered offense.’ In that instance, ‘imposed’
undoubtedly refers to the imposition of the original sentence, rather than any modification or reduction. Therefore, in order to construe § 404(b) as falling beyond the reach of 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a),
the Court would have to give two different meanings to the verb ‘impose’ within the same sentence.
Given the proximity of the repetition, the strength of the interpretative principle that ‘identical
words and phrases within the same statute should normally be given the same meaning’ is at its
zenith.”) (citing FCC v. AT & T Inc., 562 U.S. 397, 408 (2011)).
210. See, e.g., Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, § 3553, 98 Stat. 1989 (codified at 18 U.S.C.
3553(a)) (“The court, in determining the particular sentence to be imposed, shall consider—(1) the
nature and circumstances of the offense and the history and characteristics of the defendant”).
211. See Erlenbaugh v. United States, 409 U.S. 239, 243–44 (1972) (“The rule of in pari material—like any canon of statutory construction—is a reflection of practical experience in the interpretation of statutes: a legislative body generally uses a particular word with a consistent meaning
in a given context. . . . The rule . . . assumes that whenever Congress passes a new statute, it acts
aware of all previous statutes on the same subject.”); United States v. Simms, 914 F.3d 229, 243
(4th Cir. 2019) (“Finally, the Government would have us interpret the materially identical 34-word
phrase in [18 U.S.C.] § 924(c)(3)(B) and [18 U.S.C.] § 16(b) in entirely different ways. This argument flies in the face of the traditional rule that ‘a legislative body generally uses a particular word
with a consistent meaning in a given context.’ . . . Thus, it is unsurprising that the Government has
been unable to cite even one case in which the Supreme Court or this court have interpreted two
materially identical statutes differently, as it urges us to do with § 924(c)(3)(B) and § 16(b).” (citing
Erlenbaugh, 409 U.S. at 243)).
212. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a).
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of an offense . . . for the purpose of imposing an appropriate sentence.”213
Both sections envision fact-finding and application of modern case
precedents, or plenary sentencing.
By contrast, § 3582(c)(2) states, that a court, “may reduce the term of
imprisonment” for a defendant whose “sentencing range . . . has
subsequently been lowered by the Sentencing Commission.”214 The
difference between § 3582(c)(2) and section 404(b) is the verbal phrase
indicating the congressionally authorized action. The verbal phrase in
§ 3582(c)(2) is “may reduce,” whereas the verbal phrase in section 404(b)
is “may . . . impose”.215 The direct object of section 404(b)’s “impose” is
“reduced sentence.” This object phrase prohibits judges from imposing
lengthier sentences following First Step Act review. 216 As an object
phrase, however, “reduced sentence” cannot prescribe judicial authority;
authority is conferred by verbs. Thus, a textual analysis of section 404(b),
alone or with other criminal statutes, demonstrates that Congress
authorized judges to conduct plenary resentencing in First Step Act cases.

213. 18 U.S.C. § 3661; see also § 3582(a) (“The court, in determining whether to impose a term
of imprisonment, and, if a term of imprisonment is to be imposed, in determining the length of the
term, shall consider the factors set forth in section 3553(a) . . . recognizing that imprisonment is not
an appropriate means of promoting correction and rehabilitation.”).
214. 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2).
215. Compare id. with First Step Act of 2018, Pub. L. No. 115-391, § 404(b), 132 Stat. 5222
(2018).
216. See United States v. Rose, 379 F. Supp. 3d 223, 234 (S.D.N.Y. 2019) (“Some courts have
held that because the district court can impose only a ‘reduced sentence’ under the First Step Act,
the sentencing proceeding must not be a plenary one, and the term ‘impose’ cannot be given its
usual meaning. While the restriction on the district court’s ability to impose a lengthier sentence
could be a relevant factor, the nature of a sentencing cannot be dictated solely by a statutory limit
on the sentencing range. Rather, federal criminal statutes almost invariably contain statutory maximums (and occasionally mandatory minimums) that constrain judicial discretion without divesting
a sentencing proceeding of its plenary nature.”) (citation omitted).
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Fourth, legislative history supports the minority view. Senate
testimony shows that the First Step Act was intended as a “significant
reform”217 favoring judicial discretion:218
(1) Sen. Amy Klobuchar, “Significantly, this bill will not automatically
reduce any one person’s prison sentence. Instead, the bill simply allows
people to petition courts and prosecutors for an individualized review
based on the particular facts of their case.”219
(2) Sen. Bill Nelson, “This legislation will allow judges to do the job
that they were appointed to do—to use their discretion to craft an appropriate sentence to fit the crime . . . . These rigid sentences that do not
fit the crimes ought to be turned around, and that is exactly what this
legislation does.”220
(3) Sen. Corey Booker “[T]his bill includes critical sentencing reform
that will reduce mandatory minimums and give judges discretion
back—not legislators but judges who sit and see the totality of the
facts.”221

The legislative record contains no direct disagreement with these
statements.222
Fifth, plenary resentencing is legally permitted and necessary. In
general, Congress,223 the Sentencing Commission,224 prosecutors, and
217. See 164 CONG. REC. S7749 (daily ed. Dec. 18, 2018) (statement of Sen. Leahy) (“[T]he
Senate is considering passing probably the most significant bill to reform our criminal justice system in nearly a decade.”).
218. See, e.g., 164 CONG. REC. S7644 (Dec. 17, 2018) (statement of Sen. Durbin) (“These mandatory penalties don’t allow judges to distinguish between drug kingpins . . . and lower level offenders.”); 164 CONG. REC. S7649 (daily ed. Dec. 17, 2018) (statement of Sen. Grassley) (“Third,
the bill provides for more judicial discretion by expanding the existing Federal safety valve to include more low-level, nonviolent offenders.”); 164 CONG. REC. S7739 (daily ed. Dec. 18, 2018)
(statement of Sen. Schumer) (“Among other important changes, the legislation will give judges
more discretion in sentencing for low-level, nonviolent drug offenders who cooperate with the government.”). Senator Grassley and Schumer’s remarks about judicial sentencing authority, generally
or in initial sentencings, demonstrate a renewed congressional trust in sentencing judges that fairly
extends to section 404 resentencings.
219. 164 CONG. REC. S7748 (daily ed. Dec. 18, 2018) (statement of Sen. Klobuchar).
220. Id. at S7756 (statement of Sen. Nelson).
221. Id. at S7764 (statement of Sen. Booker).
222. See United States v. Hayes, 555 U.S. 415, 429 (2009) (“The remarks of a single Senator
are ‘not controlling,’ but, as Hayes recognizes, the legislative record is otherwise ‘absolutely silent.’”) (citation omitted).
223. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 3584(c) (“Multiple terms of imprisonment ordered to run consecutively or concurrently shall be treated for administrative purposes as a single, aggregate term of
imprisonment.”); see also Dean v. United States, 137 S. Ct. 1170, 1175–76 (2017) (discussing
§ 3553(a), § 3582, and § 3584(b), and concluding that “[a]s a general matter, the foregoing provisions permit a court imposing a sentence on one count of conviction to consider sentences imposed
on other counts.”).
224. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL, supra note 71, ch. 3, pt. D, introductory cmt.
§ 3D (providing “rules for determining a single offense level that encompasses all the counts of
which the defendant is convicted.”); U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, SPECIAL REPORT TO THE
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judges treat original criminal sentences as “packages” encompassing the
total counts of conviction, enhancements, consecutive sentences and
more.225 Some reformers argue that resentencing should follow the same
rules.226 But, as explained above, courts often view their authority more
narrowly at resentencing than at original sentencing.227 As a result,
advocates must justify the use of original sentencing procedures in
resentencing hearings.
Three justifications support plenary resentencing in First Step Act
cases. The first justification comes under 18 U.S.C. § 3582, which
permits plenary resentencing in First Step Act cases. As explained above,
the majority of judges view § 3582(c)(1)(B) as controlling.228 That
subsection directs courts back to the First Step Act to determine their
authority.229 While the majority of judges find no express permission for
plenary resentencing in the Act, a minority of judges find no “substantive
limit” on judicial discretion in the Act.230 These judges read the words
CONGRESS: MANDATORY MINIMUM PENALTIES IN THE FEDERAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM 22–
23 (1991), https://www.ussc.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/news/congressional-testimony-and-reports/mandatory-minimum-penalties/1991_Mand_Min_Report.pdf
[https://perma.cc/NY93DAX2] (“One potential problem in multiple count cases is how to increase the sentence when the
multiplicity of counts does in fact reflect multiple harms. . . . The guidelines resolve this problem
by directing that incremental amounts for each offense involving a distinct harm be added to the
base offense level that corresponds to the most serious offense in the group.”).
225. See United States v. Triestman, 178 F.3d 624, 631 (2d Cir. 1999) (Sotomayor, J.) (“Although Triestman may have pled guilty to his drug charges in reliance on statements in his plea
agreement and by the district court indicating that his total offense level for these convictions would
be 26, these statements were made in the context of a larger interdependent sentencing package,
which included sentences not only for the drug-related offenses but also for a § 924(c) conviction. . . . Although Triestman had finished serving his original 63-month sentence for his drug convictions at the time of his resentencing, this fact is of little consequence because Triestman was still
serving the overall term on his larger sentencing package.”).
226. See Tracy Friddle & Jon M. Sands, “Don’t Think Twice, It’s All Right”: Remands, Federal
Sentencing Guidelines & the Protect Act—A Radical “Departure”?, 36 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 527, 540
(2004) (arguing for plenary resentencing when one but not all counts are overturned on appeal
because “[a]llowing the judge such an opportunity ‘effectuates the original sentencing intent.’ That
intent, of course, ultimately is to ensure ‘that the punishment . . . fits both crime and criminal.’”);
see also 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (detailing the factors to be considered when imposing a sentence).
227. See 18 U.S.C. § 3582 (“The court may not modify a term of imprisonment once it has been
imposed except . . . .”).
228. See United States v. Rose, 379 F. Supp. 3d 223, 232 (S.D.N.Y. 2019) (“Apart from those
three circumstances, Section 3582(c)(1)(B), which some courts have characterized as the ‘procedural vehicle’ for First Step Act motions, allows for modifications ‘to the extent otherwise expressly permitted by statute or by Rule 35 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure.’”) (quoting
United States v. Potts, No. 98-CR-14010, 2019 WL 1059837, at *3 (S.D. Fla. Mar. 6, 2019)).
229. See id. at 232 (“[Section] 3582(c)(1)(B) merely redirects courts to Rule 35 and any other
sources of authority that may exist, without providing any substantive standard of its own. . . . Section 3582(c)(1)(B) is, therefore, not itself a source of authority for sentence modifications, nor does
it delineate the scope of what the district court should consider when resentencing is authorized by
another provision.”) (quotation marks and citations omitted).
230. Id.
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and phrases used in section 404, particularly the term “impose” as
discussed above, as a grant of plenary authority. For these judges, the
absence of the word “plenary” is not determinative of congressional
intent.
The second justification derives from Supreme Court precedent
holding that inter-defendant disparities do not preclude plenary
resentencing. Under § 3553(a)(6), sentencing judges must consider “the
need to avoid unwarranted sentence disparities among defendants with
similar records who have been found guilty of similar conduct”231 (e.g.,
defendants sentenced for crack distribution in 2011 versus First Step Act
defendants). In 2011, the Supreme Court ruled on the limits of subsection
(a)(6) in Pepper v. United States.232
The Pepper case began in 2003, when Chief Judge Mark W. Bennett
of the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Iowa imposed a
twenty-four-month sentence in a § 846 methamphetamine conspiracy
distribution case.233 The sentence was a “75-percent downward departure
from the low end of the Guidelines range.”234 In 2005, three days before
the defendant completed his term of incarceration, the Eighth Circuit
reversed and remanded for resentencing in light of the Booker
decision.235 At the resentencing, Judge Bennett considered the
defendant’s post-sentencing conduct and retained the twenty-four-month
sentence through a combined “40-percent downward departure based on
Pepper’s substantial assistance . . . and 59-percent downward variance
based on . . . rehabilitation since his initial sentencing.”236 The
Government appealed, and the Eighth Circuit held that Judge Bennett had
abused his discretion in granting the downward variance based on postsentencing rehabilitation.237 The Supreme Court granted certiorari and
held that a district court could consider post-sentencing rehabilitation
during a remand resentencing.238
231. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(6).
232. See Pepper v. United States, 562 U.S. 476, 504 (2011) (“Finally, we note that §§ 3553(a)(5)
and (a)(6) describe only two of the seven sentencing factors that courts must consider in imposing
sentence. At root, amicus effectively invites us to elevate two § 3553(a) factors above all others.
We reject that invitation.”).
233. See 21 U.S.C. § 846 (“Any person who attempts or conspires to commit any offense defined in this subchapter shall be subject to the same penalties as those prescribed for the offense,
the commission of which was the object of the attempt or conspiracy.”).
234. Pepper, 562 U.S. at 481–82.
235. Id. at 482.
236. Id. at 483.
237. United States v. Pepper [(Pepper II)], 486 F.3d 408, 413 (8th Cir. 2007), cert. granted,
judgment vacated, 552 U.S. 1089 (2008).
238. See Pepper, 562 U.S. at 490 (“In light of the federal sentencing framework described
above, we think it clear that when a defendant’s sentence has been set aside on appeal and his case
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Pepper suggests that broad resentencing frameworks permit judges to
consider post-sentencing conduct.239 The Pepper Court held that postsentencing rehabilitation may be considered even when it would benefit
a resentenced defendant over a properly sentenced defendant.240
Extending Pepper to First Step Act cases requires a logical leap: that
statutory-change resentencing should be treated like remand
resentencing. While Pepper might not support that leap on its own, the
case suggests that inter-defendant sentencing disparity, a § 3553 factor,
is not sufficient grounds to prohibit judicial fact-finding at
resentencing.241
The third justification recognizes that plenary resentencing is
necessary given the complexity of First Step Act cases. As described
throughout this Article, First Step Act cases involve complex charges,
offense conduct and offender characteristics.242 Years—and sometimes
decades243—separate the original sentences from resentencings under the
First Step Act. Unlike Mr. Boulding, many defendants face new judges
at their resentencings.244 While collegiality may guide these successors
toward adoption of the factual record, the greater interests of

remanded for resentencing, a district court may consider evidence of a defendant’s rehabilitation
since his prior sentencing and that such evidence may, in appropriate cases, support a downward
variance from the advisory Guidelines range.”).
239. As opposed to narrow resentencing frameworks such as 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2).
240. See Pepper, 562 U.S. at 502 (“To be sure, allowing district courts to consider evidence of
postsentencing rehabilitation may result in disparate treatment between those defendants who are
sentenced properly and those who must be resentenced. But that disparity arises not because of
arbitrary or random sentencing practices, but because of the ordinary operation of appellate sentencing review.”); see also United States v. Wirsing, 943 F.3d 175, 186 (4th Cir. 2019)
(“The First Step Act provides a vehicle for defendants sentenced under a starkly disparate regime
to seek relief that has already been available to later-sentenced defendants for nearly a decade.”).
241. See Pepper, 562 U.S. at 504 (“Finally, we note that §§ 3553(a)(5) and (a)(6) describe only
two of the seven sentencing factors that courts must consider in imposing sentence. At root, amicus
effectively invites us to elevate two § 3553(a) factors above all others. We reject that invitation.”).
242. See, e.g., United States v. Medina, No. 05-cr-58, 2019 WL 3769598, at *1 n. 1 (D. Conn.
July 17, 2019) (“At the plea hearing, Assistant United States Attorney Hal Chen described Count
One as ‘conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute 5 kilograms or more of cocaine,’ the penalties
for which were a mandatory minimum of ten years’ incarceration up to life. Similarly, in setting
out the elements of the crimes charged, Attorney Chen stated that the government would need to
first prove ‘that a conspiracy, an unlawful agreement existed to possess with intent to distribute 5
kilograms or more of cocaine.’”) (citations omitted).
243. See, e.g., United States v. Kramer, No. 87-cr-40070, 2019 WL 3322374, at *1 (S.D. Ill.
July 24, 2019) (vacating a forty-year conspiracy sentence); United States v. Eidson, No. 17-cr00490, 2019 WL 3767570, at *1 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 9, 2019) (denying defendant’s motion for reduction in sentence regarding his 1988 conviction; compassionate release, not section 404(b) motion).
244. See United States v. Rose, 379 F. Supp. 3d 223, 226 (S.D.N.Y 2019) (“The Honorable
Shira Scheindlin, who was originally assigned to this case, sentenced both Mr. Robinson and Mr.
Rose to the twenty-five year mandatory minimum sentence.”).
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parsimonious sentencing,245 renewed public trust, and criminal justice
reform recommend a deviation from the collegial tradition. For these
reasons, First Step Act “court[s] must consider the totality of the
circumstances or [they run] the risk of imposing a sentence that is greater
than necessary to serve the purposes of sentencing.”246 Further, plenary
resentencing is arguably the best path to just results.
Sixth, plenary resentencing under § 3553(a) is arguably “more
predictable to the parties, more straightforward for district courts, and
more consistently reviewable on appeal”247 than mere reduction. In fact,
a sentence reduction that rests on overturned precedent could require
appellate courts “to develop new and untried standards to limit judicial
discretion.”248 There is no evidence that Congress intended the appellate
courts to develop new procedures for First Step Act cases. Rather,
Congress likely desired a logical, defensible, plenary resentencing
process.
Seventh, in the absence of a clear limit on judicial authority, the First
Step Act should be construed broadly and remedially.249 Congress
wanted to ease the harsh cocaine base penalties of the 1980s.
Additionally, Congress did not textually limit the power of resentencing
judges as it could have done. Absent textual limits or legislative history
evidence, appellate judges should not adopt limits that undermine the
remedial impact of the First Step Act.
Thus, stronger evidence suggests that the First Step Act does not entitle
eligible defendants to plenary resentencings because the Act does not
require judges to conduct these specific proceedings. However, it does
permit judges to engage in plenary-approximate resentencings. The sole
circuit to have settled this issue disagrees, in part.
1. Unsettled Law in the Circuits
As of late May 2020, the circuits that have addressed the plenary
resentencing issue agree that the First Step Act does not impose the
requirements of an original sentencing on judges (e.g., an in-person

245. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (obliging the court to craft a sentence that is “sufficient, but not
greater than necessary” to achieve the contemporary purposes of punishment); 18 U.S.C.
§ 3553(a)(3) (obliging the court to consider “the kinds of sentences available,” including “time
served” when one more day of punishment is greater than necessary).
246. Medina, 2019 WL 3769598, at *6.
247. Rose, 379 F. Supp. 3d at 235; cf. United States v. Brookins, 08-cr-166, 2019 WL 3450991,
at *6 (W.D. Pa. July 31, 2019) (finding no authority to conduct a plenary resentencing but finding
authority for a full § 3553 analysis at resentencing).
248. Rose, 379 F. Supp. 3d at 235.
249. See Medina, 2019 WL 3769598, at *6 (“Medina should get the full benefit of the First Step
Act’s remedial purpose. Accordingly, I hold that he is entitled to a plenary resentencing.”).
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hearing).250 However, they disagree on whether courts may engage in
plenary-approximate resentencing, procedurally or substantively. The
Fifth Circuit has ruled that section 404 does not permit plenary
resentencing.251 The other circuits are still debating the issue.
The Fifth Circuit issued one of the earliest substantive opinions on the
First Step Act in United States v. Hegwood. In 2008 Mr. Hegwood
“admitted [that] he sold approximately 8 grams of cocaine base to a
cooperating witness.”252 In 2010, he was sentenced to 200 months of
imprisonment on his conduct and a career offender enhancement.253 In
January 2019, he argued that the First Step Act reduced his overall
guidelines range and eliminated his career offender enhancement; with
both changes, his new range would be 77–96 months.254 “After a hearing,
the district court left the career-offender enhancement in place, holding it
was ‘going to resentence [Hegwood] on the congressional change and
that alone.’ The court then sentenced Hegwood to 153 months . . . [or] 96
percent of the original top-of-Guidelines range.”255
The court of appeals reviewed the case de novo.256 The court rejected
Mr. Hegwood’s argument that “because Congress used the word
‘impose,’ the district court is required to calculate his Guidelines offense
level anew, which would include recalculating his career-offender
enhancement.”257 The court explained that section 404(a) limits courts to
considering covered offenses, and section 404(b) “then sets the ground
rules: the reduced sentence may be imposed ‘as if sections 2 and 3 of the
Fair Sentencing Act of 2010 . . . were in effect at the time the covered
offense was committed.’”258 Focusing on “as if” and “2010,” the court
found that “Congress did not intend that other changes were to be made
as if they too were in effect at the time of the offense.”259 The court
analogized the First Step Act to “Section 3582(c), which opens the door
250. See United States v. Alexander, 951 F.3d 706, 708 (6th Cir. 2019) (rejecting defendant’s
request for de novo resentencing hearing); see also United States v. Hegwood, 934 F.3d 414, 418
(5th Cir. 2019) (holding that Congress did not authorize plenary resentencing under the First Step
Act); cf. United States v. Cooper, 803 F. App’x 33, 35 (7th Cir. 2020) (finding no plain error in
absence of a plenary, in-person hearing where defendant only requested such a hearing on appeal).
251. See United States v. Jackson, 945 F.3d 315, 321 (5th Cir. 2019), cert. denied, No. 19-8036,
2020 WL 1906710 (U.S. Apr. 20, 2020) (explaining that Hegwood held that district courts could
not consider post-sentencing changes in the law).
252. Hegwood, 934 F.3d at 415.
253. Id.
254. Id. at 416.
255. Id.
256. Id. at 417 (“The underlying facts are not in dispute, leaving us to decide only the meaning
of a federal statute. For that interpretive task, we have de novo review.”).
257. Id.
258. Hegwood, 934 F.3d at 418.
259. Id.
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only slightly for modification of previously imposed sentences for certain
specified reasons.”260 The court then prescribed the “mechanics”261 of
section 404 resentencings:
The district court decides on a new sentence by placing itself in the time
frame of the original sentencing, altering the relevant legal landscape
only by the changes mandated by the 2010 Fair Sentencing Act. The
district court’s action is better understood as imposing, not modifying,
a sentence, because the sentencing is being conducted as if all the
conditions for the original sentencing were again in place with the one
exception. The new sentence conceptually substitutes for the original
sentence, as opposed to modifying that sentence.262

Accordingly, the Hegwood court “committed no error in continuing to
apply the career-criminal enhancement.”263 A few months later, the
circuit court sharpened the Hegwood holding: “court(s) couldn’t consider
other post-sentencing changes in the law.”264
Hegwood has not been adopted by other circuits. The Third and
Seventh Circuits acknowledged Hegwood without settling the plenary
sentencing issue.265 The Fourth Circuit rejected Hegwood’s imposition
of “the strictures of § 3582(c)(2)”266 without reaching the broader
issue267 in a split decision; the dissent cited Hegwood favorably.268 The
Sixth Circuit cited Hegwood favorably and adopted a complementary

260. Id. (citing Dillon v. United States, 560 U.S. 817, 826 (2010)).
261. Id.
262. Id. at 418–19.
263. Id. at 419.
264. United States v. Jackson, 945 F.3d 315, 321–22 (5th Cir. 2019), cert. denied, No. 19-8036,
2020 WL 1906710 (U.S. Apr. 20, 2020).
265. E.g., United States v. Coleman, 795 F. App’x 90, 91 (3d Cir. 2020) (“Section 404 gives
retroactive effect to provisions of the Fair Sentencing Act of 2010, Pub. L. 111-220, 124 Stat. 2372
(2010), that increased the drug quantities necessary to trigger mandatory minimum and maximum
penalties for crack-cocaine offenses.” (citing Hegwood, 934 F.3d at 417)); United States v. Cooper,
803 F. App’x 33, 35 (7th Cir. 2020) (mem.) (acknowledging that other courts have ruled on the
plenary resentencing issue).
266. United States v. Chambers, 956 F.3d 667, 673 (4th Cir. 2020) (citing United States v.
Wirsing, 943 F.3d 175, 177 (4th Cir. 2019); citing United States v. Boulding, 379 F. Supp. 3d 646,
654 (W.D. Mich. 2019)).
267. Id. at 673 n.3 (“Chambers does not request a plenary resentencing, and certainly does not
need one to correct the Simmons error”).
268. See Id. at 680 (Rushing, J., dissenting) (“The district court [must] decide[ ] on a new sentence by placing itself in the timeframe of the original sentencing, altering the relevant legal landscape only by the changes mandated by the 2010 Fair Sentencing Act.”); see also United States v.
Carter, 792 F. App’x 660, 663–64 (11th Cir. 2019) (adopting the view that the First Step Act provides limited authority under § 3582(c)(1)(B) and not defining the limits of that authority or prescribing procedure as sharply as Hegwood). See also United States v. Venable, 943 F.3d 187, 194–
95 n.11 (4th Cir. 2019) (adopting a § 3582(c)(1)(B) view and acknowledging, but not adopting,
Hegwood).
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approach under § 3582(c)(1)(B) in one case,269 but left the door open for
plenary-approximate resentencing in others.270 With arguably the most
appellate case law on this issue, the Sixth Circuit illustrates how unsettled
this area of law remains.
2. Sixth Circuit as Case Study
The Sixth Circuit’s October 2019 decision in United States v.
Alexander, a per curiam order later designated for publication, settled
some of the plenary sentencing issues.271 The Alexander court rejected
the defendant’s argument that “the First Step Act requires the district
court to conduct a de novo resentencing hearing”272 and affirmed the trial
court’s sentence reduction of 262 months of imprisonment—the amount
the defendant had requested.273 While Alexander announced that plenary
resentencing was not required under the First Step Act, it did not address
what resentencing judges were permitted or required to do. Nor did the
Alexander court mention the Supreme Court’s Pepper decision or § 3553;
those analyses came later.
In mid-April 2020, the Sixth Circuit adopted a broad reading of
procedural authority under the First Step Act in United States v. Allen.274
According to the Allen court, Congress understood that original defense
counsel strategy had been influenced by the mandatory minimums of the
1980s, that significant time had passed between original sentencings and
resentencings under the First Step Act, and that new judges presided in
many cases.275 For these reasons, “Congress contemplated that district
courts may look to § 3553(a)’s familiar framework when deciding
269. United States v. Smith, 958 F.3d 494, 498 (6th Cir. 2020) (“We have held that a sentence
reduction under the First Step Act is a § 3582(c) modification. We have also explained that ‘[t]he
First Step Act’s limited, discretionary authorization to impose a reduced sentence is inconsistent
with a plenary resentencing.’”) (internal citations omitted). Id. (quoting Hegwood, 934 F.3d at 418).
270. E.g., United States v. Allen, 956 F.3d 355, 357–58 (6th Cir. 2020) (discussing other information courts may consider in the decision to reduce a defendant’s sentence); United States v.
Smith, 959 F.3d 701, 704 (6th Cir. 2020) (discussing that it is within the district court’s discretion
to determine an appropriate sentence in accordance with the 3553(a) factors, the First Step Act and
the Fair Sentencing Act).
271. See United States v. Foreman, 958 F.3d 506, 510 (6th Cir. 2020) (noting that eligible defendants under section 404 are “not entitled to a plenary resentencing” (citing United States v.
Alexander, 951 F.3d 706, 708 (6th Cir. 2019))).
272. Alexander, 951 F.3d at 708 (citing Hegwood, 934 F.3d at 418); see also United States v.
Boulding, 379 F. Supp. 3d 646, 653 (W.D. Mich. 2019) (noting that reducing a sentence is not the
equivalent of a plenary resentencing).
273. Alexander, 951 F.3d at 709.
274. See Allen, 956 F.3d at 357–58 (“Section 404’s silence regarding the standard the courts
should use . . . cannot be read to limit the information courts may consider.”).
275. Id. at 358 (“The judges considering First Step Act motions will frequently not be the original sentencing judges because of the length of sentences in crack-cocaine and cocaine-base
cases.”).
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whether to reduce a defendant’s sentence under the First Step Act.”276
The Allen court explained that the § 3553(a) framework was not
synonymous with the remand resentencing procedure at issue in Pepper
because “the First Step Act § 404 in contrast only granted courts the
power to modify sentences.”277 Still, the court found that the distinction
“does not logically prevent courts from considering post-sentencing
conduct in assessing the § 3553(a) factors during a § 3582(c)(1)(B)
sentence-modification proceeding.”278 In early May, the court moderated
its stance in United States v. (Lakento) Smith.279 The Smith court cited
Allen for the proposition that the “First Step Act does not authorize
plenary resentencing procedure of the type contemplated in Pepper.”280
While Smith constrained the circuit’s courts to less-than-Pepper
resentencing, two remand opinions suggest that resentencing courts must
sufficiently address the § 3553(a) factors.
In numerous decisions, the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals confirmed
that its courts could consider § 3553(a) factors.281 But in United States v.
Maxwell and United States v. (Marty) Smith, the court required § 3553(a)
findings282 in First Step Act cases.
In Maxwell, an unpublished January 2020 opinion, the court suggested
that the First Step Act triggers a § 3553(a) duty.283 Mr. Maxwell, who
was serving a thirty-year sentence for cocaine base and heroin
convictions, mailed a one-page letter to the district court requesting
appointment of counsel for a First Step Act motion.284 The district court
treated the letter as a motion on the merits and “determined that Maxwell
was not eligible for a sentence reduction.”285 Citing the First Step Act’s
emphasis on motions, the appellate court held that the defendant did “not
file a motion seeking relief under section 404 because his letter made no

276. Id.
277. Id. (noting the difference between plenary resentencing and sentence modification).
278. Id.
279. United States v. Smith, 958 F.3d 494, 498–99 (6th Cir. 2020).
280. Id. (citing Allen, 956 F.3d at 357–58).
281. Allen, 956 F.3d at 357 (“The First Step Act does not prohibit courts from considering the
factors outlined in § 3553(a), which include the applicable sentencing guidelines range and other
relevant information about the defendant’s history and conduct.”).
282. United States v. Smith, 959 F.3d 701, 704 (6th Cir. 2020) (“We are confident on remand
that the district court can determine whether, in its discretion, a sentence less than 20 years is appropriate after considering the § 3553(a) factors with reference to the purposes of the First Step Act
and Fair Sentencing Act.”); United States v. Maxwell, 800 F. App’x 373, 378 (6th Cir. 2020) (“In
the event that Maxwell knocks at the door, we trust that the district court will heed its duty to
consider both the factors in § 3553, along with Congress’s significant decision to allow prisoners
to retroactively benefit from the Fair Sentencing Act.”).
283. Maxwell, 800 F. App’x at 377.
284. Id. at 374.
285. Id. at 375.
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arguments and sought no relief beyond the appointment of an
attorney.”286 The court then remanded the case “so that the district court
[could] reconsider its decision about appointed counsel.”287 The court
explained that a proper First Step Act motion would open the door to
resentencing288 and trigger the district court’s “duty to consider both the
factors in § 3553, along with Congress’s significant decision to allow
prisoners to retroactively benefit from the Fair Sentencing Act.”289
In (Marty) Smith, a published May 2020 opinion, the appellate court
determined that “district court[s] must consider the factors in § 3553(a)”
during First Step Act resentencings.290 Mr. Smith pled guilty to
conspiracy to distribute more than fifty grams of crack cocaine in 2006
and was serving a twenty-year sentence.291 Like Mr. Maxwell, Mr. Smith
sent a letter to the court requesting appointment of counsel for a First Step
Act motion.292 The district court construed that letter as a motion on the
merits, found Mr. Smith eligible for First Step Act resentencing, and
declined to reduce his sentence.293 The appellate court analyzed the
district court’s “explanation for denying Smith’s motion for a reduction”
and determined that it “[did] not adequately explain why Smith should
not receive at least some sentence reduction.”294 The appellate court
found that “the district court failed to provide a sufficiently compelling
justification for maintaining a sentence that is now twice the guideline
range set by Congress.”295 The court then remanded the case so that the
district court could “determine whether, in its discretion, a sentence less
than 20 years is appropriate after considering the § 3553(a) factors with
reference to the purposes of the First Step Act and Fair Sentencing
Act.”296
These Sixth Circuit opinions demonstrate some of the challenges
district courts face in determining procedural and substantive
requirements under the First Step Act. While the Sixth Circuit Court of
Appeals has clearly ruled that de novo resentencings are not required

286. Id. at 376.
287. Id. at 377.
288. Id. at 378 (noting this applies as long as the defendant has met the Act’s eligibility
requirements).
289. Id.
290. United States v. Smith, 959 F.3d 701, 703 (6th Cir. 2020).
291. Id. at 702.
292. Id.
293. Id.
294. Id. at 703.
295. Id. at 704.
296. Id.
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under the First Step Act,297 the outer bounds of judicial authority and duty
remain gray areas.
Arguably, even if the First Step Act does not authorize Pepper plenary
resentencings,298 it seems unlikely that the Sixth Circuit would remand
for reconsideration on a sparser procedure, leaner law, or lesser record
than adopted by a resentencing court. But the appellate court might
remand where a district court has considered two or more of the § 3553(a)
factors299 but has not sufficiently justified its new sentence.300 As a
result, the plenary resentencing issue is insufficiently settled in the Sixth
Circuit, as in nearly all others.
C. Hybrid Convictions
The third question courts have had to grapple with is whether judges
may adjust only the crack cocaine sentences of First Step Act eligible
defendants, or those sentences plus concurrent non-crack sentences.
First Step Act cases can involve convictions for weapons,301
racketeering,302 other drugs, and other crimes.303 District courts have
drawn varied conclusions about their authority to resentence section 404
defendants with concurrent non-crack convictions, or hybrid convictions.
Some judges have declined to resentence hybrid defendants on the
grounds that (1) non-crack convictions are not covered offenses under

297. See United States v. Alexander, 951 F.3d 706, 708 (6th Cir. 2019) (“This rule provides
further support for the conclusion that a sentence reduction authorized by the First Step Act and
§ 3582(c)(1)(B) does not require a de novo resentencing hearing.” (citing Dillon v. United States,
560 U.S. 817, 827–28 (2010))).
298. United States v. Smith, 958 F.3d 494, 498–99 (6th Cir. 2020) (citing United States v. Allen,
956 F.3d 355, 357–58 (6th Cir. 2020)).
299. See Smith, 959 F.3d at 703 (“[T]he court briefly discussed the nature and circumstances of
Smith’s offense and the need to protect the public—two of the § 3553(a) factors.”).
300. See id. at 704 (“[T]hese considerations are accounted for within the guidelines calculation
and therefore do not provide sufficient justification for maintaining a sentence that is twice the
maximum of the guideline range set by Congress.”).
301. See, e.g., United States v. McKinney, 382 F. Supp. 3d 1163, 1164 (D. Kan. 2019) (“In June
2007, defendant Jason McKinney pled guilty to one count of possession with intent to distribute 50
grams or more of cocaine base in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(A)(iii) and one count of use
of a firearm in relation to a drug trafficking crime in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c). . . .
Mr. McKinney now seeks relief under section 404 of the First Step Act of 2018”).
302. See, e.g., United States v. Maupin, No. 04-cr-00047, 2019 WL 3752975, at *1 (W.D. Va.
June 3, 2019) (“Defendant was adjudicated guilty based on his participation ‘in a racketeering influenced corrupt organization’ in violation of RICO.”); see also United States v. Powell, No. 99cr-264-18, 2019 WL 4889112, at *1–2 (D. Conn. Oct. 3, 2019) (“The jury found Mr. Powell guilty
of . . . conspiracy to murder the Trumbull Gardens Terrace . . . crew members and associates . . . .
On January 4, 2019, Mr. Powell moved for his immediate release or resentencing under Section
404 of the First Step Act.”).
303. See United States v. Jones, No. 99-cr-264-6, 2019 WL 4933578, at *12 (D. Conn. Oct. 7,
2019) (addressing the court’s authority to resentence concurrent heroin distribution convictions).
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section 404(a);304 or (2) plenary resentencing of the non-crack
convictions is not authorized by the First Step Act.305 The section 404(a)
argument seems likely to fail given the emerging doctrine of broad,
categorical eligibility discussed in Section IV.A. The plenary
resentencing argument is not yet supported by circuit court case law, but
it seems likely to find favor with the Fifth Circuit for the reasons
discussed in Section IV.B.306
Other judges have resentenced hybrid defendants307 on three grounds:
(1) a single covered offense satisfies section 404(a)’s low eligibility
threshold,308 (2) the crack conviction was the predicate conduct for the
non-crack conviction(s), or (3) the original sentencing package is now
inseparable into crack and non-crack constituents. The section 404(a)
eligibility threshold analysis largely mirrors the discussion in IV.A.,
whereas the predicate conduct and sentencing package arguments are

304. See, e.g., Maupin, 2019 WL 3752975, at *1 (“However, for an offense to be a ‘covered
offense’ its statutory penalties must have been ‘modified by section 2 or 3 of the Fair Sentencing
Act.’ The statutory penalties associated with RICO simply do not fit that description.”) (internal
citations omitted).
305. See, e.g., McKinney, 382 F. Supp. 3d at 1168 (“For all of these reasons, the court believes
that the Circuit, if faced with the issue, would conclude that Mr. McKinney is not entitled to a full
resentencing under the First Step Act and, because retroactive application of the Fair Sentencing
Act does not impact Mr. McKinney’s Guidelines calculation, would conclude that his motion for a
reduction should be denied.”).
306. Note that the Fifth Circuit’s key plenary resentencing arguments do not address the hybrid
conviction issue. United States v. Hegwood, 934 F.3d 414, 418 (5th Cir. 2019); United States v.
Jackson, 945 F.3d 315, 321–22 (5th Cir. 2019).
307. See, e.g., United States v. Jones, No. 96-cr-00399, 2020 WL 886694, at *2 (D. Md. Feb.
24, 2020) (finding that the rule of lenity offers a viable path to eligibility in a case involving crack
and heroin); see also United States v. Medina, No. 05-cr-58, 2019 WL 3769598, at *3 (D. Conn.
July 17, 2019) (“Ignoring the crack cocaine portion of Medina’s conviction in favor of the powder
cocaine portion would not serve the purpose of the Act. ‘Both the Fair Sentencing Act and the First
Step Act have the remedial purpose of mitigating the unfairness created by the crack-to-powder
cocaine ratio, and the statutes should be construed in favor of broader coverage.’” (quoting United
States v. Rose, 379 F. Supp. 223, 230 (S.D.N.Y. 2019))); see also Powell, 2019 WL 4889112, at
*3 (“This language does not, on its face, restrict eligibility to defendants who were only convicted
of a singular violation of a federal criminal statute whose penalties were modified by section 2 or
section 3 of the Fair Sentencing Act. So long as a defendant was convicted of ‘a violation’—i.e., at
least one violation—for which the penalties were modified by section 2 or 3 of the Fair Sentencing
Act, he or she is eligible for relief under the First Step Act.”).
308. E.g., Jones, 2020 WL 886694, at *3 (“Under the plain language of Wirsing—and that
opinion’s directive that there should not be a ‘complicated and eligibility-limiting determination at
the ‘covered offense’ stage of the analysis’—Jones’s conviction for conspiracy to distribute crack
cocaine and heroin is a ‘covered offense’ under the First Step Act.” (citing United States v. Wirsing,
943 F.3d 175, 186 (4th Cir. 2019))); Powell, 2019 WL 4889112, at *4 (“Eligibility for relief under
the First Step Act thus turns not on whether a conviction, even if it incorporates several violations
of criminal statutes, may be construed as a whole as a “covered offense,” but whether there is a
conviction of a violation of a criminal statute for which the statutory penalties were modified by
section 2 or 3 of the Fair Sentencing Act.”).
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distinct from the plenary resentencing discussion and unique to hybrid
cases.309
Drug distribution can serve as the predicate conduct for non-drug
convictions.310 For instance, a series of organized drug deals can support
a conviction under § 1962(c), the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt
Organization (RICO) Act.311 The RICO Act requires “a pattern of
racketeering activity,” of “two acts . . . the last of which occurred within
ten years (excluding any period of imprisonment) after the commission
of a prior act of racketeering activity.”312 These racketeering activities or
acts are tethered to the parent RICO count in two ways.313 First, a
prosecutor must prove at least two racketeering acts before a jury can find
a defendant guilty of a parent RICO count.314 Second, the racketeering

309. That is, if an appellate court decides that section 404 eligibility is categorical but full plenary resentencing is not authorized, its courts could still have authority to resentence hybrid convictions where: (1) drug activities served as the predicate for a non-drug conviction, and the resulting sentence was invalidated by the Fair Sentencing Act; or (2) the original sentencing judge
imposed a single sentence on combined drug and non-drug counts.
310. See, e.g., Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-452, § 1961, 84 Stat. 947
(establishing that non-drug convictions include Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organization
(“RICO”) conspiracy to distribute cocaine base); see also CHARLES DOYLE, CONG. RESEARCH
SERV., R45075, MANDATORY MINIMUM SENTENCING OF FEDERAL DRUG OFFENSES 17 (2018)
(“Section 924(c) is triggered when a firearm is used or possessed in furtherance of a predicate
offense. The predicate offenses are crimes of violence and certain drug trafficking crimes.”); United
States v. Davis, 139 S. Ct. 2319, 2331, 2336 (2019) (“Instead, it accepted the categorical approach
as given and simply declared that certain drug trafficking crimes automatically trigger § 924 penalties, regardless of the risk of violence that attends them . . . . We agree with the court of appeals’
conclusion that § 924(c)(3)(B) is unconstitutionally vague.”).
311. 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c). Such drug deals could also support a concurrent or simultaneous conviction for conspiracy to distribute under 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1); see, e.g., United States v. White,
413 F. Supp. 3d. 15, 46–47 (D.D.C. 2019) (finding that defendants were likely to be eligible for
relief for RICO charges predicated on crack distribution activity but declining to reduce their sentences on other grounds); Verdict Form at 1–2, United States v. Powell, No. 99-cr-264 (D. Conn.
filed June 3, 2005) (containing both RICO and non-RICO drug distribution charges). See also
United States v. Grayson, 795 F.2d 278, 280 (3d Cir. 1986) (holding that a racketeering act is not
the same offense as the same non-RICO conduct for double jeopardy purposes, in part because the
RICO Act was intended to deter continuous, concerted criminal conduct whereas other criminal
acts were intended to deter discrete criminal acts such as narcotics violations).
312. 18 U.S.C. § 1961(5); Jury Instructions at 44, United States v. Powell, No. 99-cr-264 (D.
Conn. filed June 3, 2005) (“[Section c of] RICO makes it a crime to participate in the conduct of
an enterprise’s affairs through a pattern of certain violations known as ‘racketeering acts.’ In this
case, the charged racketeering acts include drug conspiracy, conspiracy to murder, attempted murder, murder, and witness tampering.”).
313. Government’s Opposition to Defendant’s Motion for Resentencing under the First Step
Act at 20, United States v. Powell, No. 99-cr-264 (D. Conn. filed August 9, 2019) (“[T]he statutory
maximum penalty on the RICO counts is tethered to racketeering acts 1-A and 1-B”).
314. See, e.g., Verdict Form at 1–2, United States v. Powell, No. 99-cr-264 (D. Conn. filed June
3, 2005) (finding racketeering acts 1a and 1b—but not 1c—proven, and finding Mr. Powell guilty
of Count One (RICO)).
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acts can raise the mandatory statutory RICO penalties from twenty years
to life.315
Some First Step Act defendants are serving life sentences for RICO
counts predicated on the old drug laws.316 In 2010, the Fair Sentencing
Act raised the minimum drug quantities for a life sentence.317 In 2018,
the First Step Act made those new threshold quantities retroactive.318 As
a result, the First Step Act arguably invalidated life imprisonment for
RICO convictions tethered to drug quantities below the Fair Sentencing
Act’s minimum threshold for a life sentence.319 This invalidation view is
not universal.320 But better evidence suggests that Congress intended the
Fair Sentencing Act to raise the threshold necessary for lengthy terms of
incarceration321 and the First Step Act to permit judges to adjust newly
315. See Government’s Opposition to Defendant’s Motion for Resentencing under the First Step
Act at 20, United States v. Powell, No. 99-cr-264 (D. Conn. filed August 9, 2019) (“[I]f the Court
determines the three crack-cocaine conspiracy convictions (Counts Three, Four and Six) are ‘covered offenses,’ it follows that the RICO and RICO conspiracy convictions are ‘covered offenses,’
because the statutory maximum penalty on the RICO counts is tethered to racketeering acts 1-A
and 1-B, the crack-cocaine conspiracy counts.”); see also 18 U.S.C. § 1963(a) (“Whoever violates
any provision of section 1962 . . . shall be . . . imprisoned not more than 20 years (or for life if the
violation is based on a racketeering activity for which the maximum penalty includes life imprisonment)”).
316. See, e.g., Reply Memo in Further Support of First Step Act at 4, United States v. Powell,
No. 99-cr-264 (D. Conn. filed August 23, 2019) (“At Mr. Powell’s original sentencing, the statutory
maximum increased to life on the RICO counts . . . because of Racketeering Acts 1-A and 1-B, two
drug conspiracies involving more than 50 grams of crack. At the time, those offenses carried a
maximum of life imprisonment.”).
317. See Fair Sentencing Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-220, § 2, 124 Stat. 2372 (“COCAINE
SENTENCING DISPARITY REDUCTION. (a) . . . Section 401(b)(1) of the Controlled Substances Act (21 U.S.C. 841(b)(1)) is amended . . . (1) in subparagraph (A)(iii), by striking ‘50
grams’ and inserting ‘280 grams’ . . . .”).
318. See 164 CONG. REC. S7774 (daily ed. Dec. 18, 2018) (statement of Sen. Feinstein) (explaining that The First Step Act of 2018 made “the Fair Sentencing Act retroactive”); First Step
Act of 2018, Pub. L. No. 115-391, 132 Stat. 5194.
319. See United States v. Powell, No. 99-cr-264-18, 2019 WL 4889112, at *8 (D. Conn. Oct. 3,
2019) (“The statutory maximum and minimums for the RICO and RICO conspiracies in Counts
One and Two are based on the underlying predicate acts. For the drug conspiracy racketeering acts,
the modifications under the Fair Sentencing Act would not result in a sentence above the statutory
minimum of five years and a statutory maximum of forty years imprisonment . . . . Because none
of his convictions now provide for a life sentence, Mr. Powell’s sentence of life imprisonment must
be reduced to no more than the highest sentence now possible: forty years.”).
320. See, e.g., United States v. Maupin, No. 04-cr-00047, 2019 WL 3752975, at *1 (W.D. Va.
June 3, 2019) (“Nonetheless Defendant argues that his conviction is a ‘covered offense’ because
the statutory maximum for his RICO offense was set by a ‘crack cocaine offense, with a statutory
maximum of life.’ However, for an offense to be a ‘covered offense’ its statutory penalties must
have been ‘modified by section 2 or 3 of the Fair Sentencing Act.’ The statutory penalties associated
with RICO simply do not fit that description. Furthermore, it is clear that ‘Congress intended that
a RICO violation be a discrete offense’ separate and apart from any predicate offenses, and this
Court will treat it accordingly.”) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
321. See, e.g., 164 CONG. REC. S7747 (daily ed. Dec. 18, 2018) (statement of Sen. Klobuchar)
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invalidated sentences.322 As a result, some judges are reducing sentences
for non-drug convictions predicated upon drug activity implicated by the
Fair Sentencing Act.323
Judges are also modifying sentencing packages,324 or singular
sentences for combined drug and non-drug counts, as in United States v.
Powell.325 Quinne Powell was sentenced to life in prison for the
combined counts of (1) Racketeering in Corrupt Organizations under
§ 1962(c) (Count One), (2) RICO conspiracy under § 1962(d) (Count
Two), and (3) conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute fifty grams
or more of cocaine base under 21 U.S.C. § 846.326 The predicate
racketeering acts for Mr. Powell’s § 1962(c) conviction included two
drug conspiracies, conspiracy to murder, and obstruction and witness
tampering.327 “Racketeering Act 3, a conspiracy to commit murder
conviction [under the] Connecticut General Statutes . . . carrie[d] a
maximum penalty of 20 years’ incarceration.”328
(“The sentencing laws on low-level drug offenders were implemented decades ago . . . . This has
resulted in prison sentences that actually don’t fit the crime.”); id. at S7749 (statement of Sen.
Leahy) (“For far too long, the legislative response to any and all public safety concerns was as
simple as it was flawed: No matter the perceived ill, we turned to arbitrary and inflexible mandatory
minimums to cure it . . . . It routinely results in low-level offenders spending far longer in prison
than either public safety or common sense requires.”); cf. Maupin, 2019 WL 3752975 at *1 (citing
United States v. Crosby, 20 F.3d 480, 484 (D.C. Cir. 1994)) (holding that Congress intended that
RICO offenses could be prosecuted separately from their predicate acts without double jeopardy
implications, but not discussing the impact on RICO sentences when their tethered predicates were
reformed by retroactive sentencing laws).
322. See 164 CONG. REC. S7748 (daily ed. Dec. 18, 2018) (statement of Sen. Klobuchar) (supporting the First Step Act on the grounds that some mandatory minimum sentences are unjust); id.
at S7756 (statement of Sen. Nelson); id. at S7762 (statement of Sen. Booker).
323. See, e.g., Powell, 2019 WL 4889112, at *8 (“Because none of his convictions now provide
for a life sentence, Mr. Powell’s sentence of life imprisonment must be reduced to no more than
the highest sentence now possible: forty years.”).
324. See United States v. Triestman, 178 F.3d 624, 631 (2d Cir. 1999) (Sotomayor, J.) (explaining the concept and function of a sentencing package).
325. See, e.g., Powell, 2019 WL 4889112, at *7 (“Judge Nevas imposed, in the singular, ‘a
sentence of life in prison’ (citation omitted) [for the drug distribution and RICO counts.]”); Wright
v. United States, 425 F. Supp. 3d 588, 598 (E.D. Va. 2019) (“Since Petitioner Wright is eligible for
a new sentence for his drug counts, the Court may impose a new sentence on the gun counts as well
or else risk ‘unbundl[ing] the entire sentence package.’” (quoting United States v. Hadden, 475
F.3d 652, 669 (4th Cir. 2007))).
326. See Powell, 2019 WL 4889112, at *7 (discussing Powell’s offenses); Sentencing Transcript at 31, Powell, No. 99-cr-264 (D. Conn. filed Feb. 14, 2006) (“The defendant is sentenced to
the custody of the Bureau of Prisons for the rest of his life on Counts One, Two, Three, Four, and
Six”); Judgment at 1, Powell, No. 99-cr-264 (D. Conn. filed Jan. 5, 2006) (“The defendant is hereby
committed to the custody of the United States Bureau of Prisons to be imprisoned for life on Counts
1, 2, 3, 4 and 6”); see also 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c)–(d) (enumerating the prohibited activities under the
act).
327. These predicate racketeering acts were proved to the jury. Verdict Form at 1–3, United
States v. Powell, No. 99-cr-264 (D. Conn. filed June 3, 2005).
328. Powell, 2019 WL 4889112, at *8.
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At resentencing, the Powell court found that the conspiracy to murder
act was combined with acts carrying life maximums, and “[t]he RICO,
RICO Conspiracy, obstruction of justice and witness tampering . . .
convictions . . . were all addressed together, with the crack cocaine
violation, as part of a single sentencing package, as inextricably related
offenses.”329 Citing Second Circuit precedent in United States v.
Triestman, the resentencing judge found that he had authority under the
First Step Act to resentence Mr. Powell’s package of interdependent,
inseparable counts.330 Thus, when an original judge imposed a sentence
on a cluster of factually related but statutorily distinct offenses,331 some
of which were affected by the Fair Sentencing Act, sentencing package
doctrine may support the reduction of the singular sentence without a
plenary resentencing.
Thus, stronger evidence suggests that the First Step Act permits judges
to reduce sentences on hybrid convictions for three independent reasons:
(1) section 404’s low eligibility threshold and ameliorative purpose, (2)
because the convictions rested on predicate acts invalidated by the Fair
Sentencing Act, and (3) because the non-crack convictions were
sentenced with the crack convictions as a single and inseparable
sentencing package.
As of late May 2020, only the Fourth Circuit has held that judges have
authority to resentence hybrid convictions under the First Step Act.332 In
United States v. Gravatt, the circuit adopted a low eligibility threshold
approach to hybrid cases.
329. Id. at *7; Sentencing Transcript at 31, United States v. Powell, No. 99-cr-264 (D. Conn.
filed Feb. 14, 2006) (“The defendant is sentenced to the custody of the Bureau of Prisons for the
rest of his life on Counts One, Two, Three, Four, and Six”); Judgment at 1, Powell, No. 99-cr-264
(D. Conn. filed Jan. 5, 2006) (“The defendant is hereby committed to the custody of the United
States Bureau of Prisons to be imprisoned for life on Counts 1, 2, 3, 4 and 6.”).
330. See Powell, 2019 WL 4889112, at *7 (“The Court thus has the authority to reduce Mr.
Powell’s entire sentence under the First Step Act.” (citing United States v. Triestman, 178 F.3d
624, 630 (2d Cir. 1999))); see also Dean v. United States, 137 S. Ct. 1170, 1175–76 (2017) (“As a
general matter, the foregoing provisions permit a court imposing a sentence on one count of conviction to consider sentences imposed on other counts.”).
331. See, e.g., United States v. Jones, No. 99-cr-264-6, 2019 WL 4933578, at *12 (D. Conn.
Oct. 7, 2019) (“The Court therefore finds that the crack cocaine violation was addressed with heroin
as part of a single sentencing package, and that these two offenses are inextricably related. The
Court thus has the authority to reduce Mr. Jones’s entire drug conspiracy sentence under the First
Step Act.”); id. at *13 (“The Court further notes that when Judge Dorsey declined to re-sentence
Mr. Jones, he titled his decision ‘Order re: Reduction of Sentence re: Crack Cocaine Offense.’
Again, Judge Dorsey did not speak of multiple sentences, but a single sentence.”) (citation omitted).
332. United States v. Gravatt, 953 F.3d 258, 264 (4th Cir. 2020). United States v. McKenzie,
805 F. App’x 223, 223 (4th Cir. 2020) (per curiam); see United States v. Winter, 803 F. App’x 715,
715 (4th Cir. 2020) (per curiam) (illustrating hybrid cases remanded on Gravatt grounds). See also
United States v. Hardwick, 802 F. App’x 707, 710–11 (3d Cir. 2020) (decided one month before
Gravatt, finding no binding circuit precedent on the issue and a split among district courts, and
declining to decide the issue in the first instance).
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Mr. Gravatt pled guilty to conspiracy to distribute fifty grams or more
of cocaine base and five kilograms or more of powder cocaine.333 In
2003, “[t]he district court sentenced [him] to 292 months in prison and 5
years of supervised release.”334 In 2019, the district court denied Mr.
Gravatt’s motion for relief under the First Step Act on the grounds that
his sentence was “independently supported” by the statutory penalty
range for powder cocaine, which had not been altered by the Fair
Sentencing Act.335 The circuit court rejected this interpretation on two
grounds. First, the court found “nothing in the text of the [First Step] Act
requiring that a defendant be convicted of a single violation of a federal
criminal statute whose penalties were modified by section 2 or section 3
of the Fair Sentencing Act.”336 Second, the court of appeals found that
the district court’s narrow reading of section 404 eligibility “would, in
effect, impose an additional limitation to the Act’s applicability” beyond
what Congress had prescribed or intended.337
The remaining circuits have not resolved this issue, though nonbinding
precedents suggest that the Sixth Circuit might adopt the Fourth Circuit’s
low eligibility threshold approach338 while the Eleventh Circuit might
reject it.339 As of May 2020, no circuit court has substantively addressed
the predicate act or sentencing package arguments.340

333. Gravatt, 953 F.3d at 261; United States v. Gravatt, No. 01-736-01, 2019 WL 2366587, at
*1 (D.S.C. June 5, 2019).
334. Gravatt, 953 F.3d at 261 (“In light of his total offense level of 39, criminal history category
of II and the relevant statutory provisions, the district court calculated Gravatt’s advisory guideline
range to be 292 to 365 months of imprisonment.”).
335. Id. (“Thus, the district court denied the motion because the crack cocaine aspect of the
dual-object conspiracy ultimately had no effect on his statutory penalty range. Gravatt faced the
same statutory penalty range for having conspired to possess with intent to distribute and to distribute 5 or more kilograms of powder cocaine, the penalties for which were not modified by the Fair
Sentencing Act and which independently supported his sentence.”); see Gravatt, 2019 WL
2366587, at *2 (“Because he also admitted guilt to conspiracy to distribute 5 kilograms or more of
cocaine, his statutory penalty range was 10 years to Life, independent of the penalty on the cocaine
base offense. . . . Persons convicted of cocaine base offenses, but whose statutory ranges were not
affected, are not eligible for relief. That is what happened here.”).
336. Gravatt, 953 F.3d at 264.
337. Id.
338. United States v. Woods, 949 F.3d 934, 937 (6th Cir. 2020) (finding that a hybrid defendant
“has cleared the initial hurdles to eligibility under the First Step Act” without a corresponding discussion of the issue).
339. United States v. Pubien, 805 F. App’x 727, 730 (11th Cir. 2020) (per curiam) (holding that
the First Step Act does not grant judges the authority to resentence powder cocaine convictions and
finding the defendant’s sentencing package arguments factually unsupported).
340. Id. at 731 (“The sentencing-package doctrine has no place here, however, where the original sentence imposed was not a package of interconnected sanctions.”).
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D. Original Drug Quantity Adoption
The fourth question courts have had to grapple with is whether judges
must adopt the operative drug quantities found at the original sentencing.
Since the mid-1980s, federal drug sentences have been driven by
statutory and guidelines quantity thresholds.341 For instance, 21 U.S.C.
§ 841 has two penalty ranges triggered by drug type and quantity
thresholds.342 Prior to the Fair Sentencing Act, fifty grams of crack
cocaine triggered the harsher of the two § 841 penalty ranges, carrying a
maximum penalty of life imprisonment.343 Because of this low quantity
threshold for life imprisonment, many juries were not asked to find
quantities above “50 grams or more.”344 However, the statutory ranges
did not—and do not—match sentencing guidelines ranges. The
Sentencing Commission has created more than a dozen quantity-driven
categories.345
To resolve the statutory and guidelines mismatch, judges make
additional quantity findings at sentencing.346 Most judges, including the
original sentencing judges in section 404 cases, adopt quantities from
PSRs or stipulated plea agreements.347 In the years since most
341. See, e.g., 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(A) (imposing a ten-year mandatory minimum sentence on
defendants convicted of manufacturing or distributing 50 grams or more of methamphetamines);
U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL, supra note 7171, § 2D1.1(c) (discussing their drug quantity table).
342. 21 U.S.C. § 841.
343. See Fair Sentencing Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-220, § 2, 124 Stat. 2372 (“21 U.S.C.
841(b)(1) is amended . . . (1) in subparagraph (A)(iii), by striking ‘50 grams’ and inserting ‘280
grams’”); see, e.g., Verdict Form at 1, United States v. Boulding, No. 08-cr-65 (W.D. Mich. filed
Oct. 3, 2008) (“As to Count 1 of the indictment, charging the defendants . . . with conspiracy to
distribute and to possess with intent to distribute cocaine base (“crack cocaine”) . . . . C. What quantity of crack cocaine do you find beyond a reasonable doubt was involved in the conspiracy? [X
mark] 50 grams or more of crack cocaine . . . .”); Verdict Form at 4, United States v. Powell, No.
99-cr-264 (D. Conn. filed Jan. 5, 2006) (“Count Three (Conspiracy to Possess with Intent to Distribute and to Distribute Narcotics): . . . [Finding the defendant Guilty] . . . [of] 50 grams or more
of a mixture or substance containing a detectable amount of ‘crack’ cocaine”).
344. See, e.g., Fair Sentencing Act of 2010 § 2 (listing 280 grams as the minimum quantity for
life imprisonment); see also United States v. Stanback, 377 F. Supp. 3d 618, 621 (W.D. Va. 2019)
(“On March 20, 2003, a jury convicted Stanback of one count of conspiracy to distribute and possess with intent to distribute 50 grams or more of cocaine base in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1)
(Count 1)”).
345. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL, supra note 7171, § 2D.1.1(a)(5) (explaining offense levels of their drug quantity table).
346. United States vs. Simmons, 964 F.2d 763, 775 (8th Cir. 1992).
347. Ellis, supra note 72, at 48 (“The federal presentence investigation report (PSR) is crucial . . . . it is the document most heavily relied on by the judge in imposing sentence—particularly
in those cases where a guilty plea has been entered and the court knows little about the defendant.”);
id.; see Sentencing Transcript at 25, United States v. Boulding, No. 08-cr-00065 (W.D. Mich. filed
May 13, 2009) (“The drug quantity is admittedly not easy to calculate in a case like this, but my
comments when I went through the [presentence] report was that, if anything, it seemed to me that
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section 404-eligible defendants were sentenced, however, the Supreme
Court has articulated additional safeguards that can affect quantity
findings during original sentencings.
In Apprendi v. New Jersey, the Court held that “[o]ther than the fact of
a prior conviction, any fact that increases the penalty for a crime beyond
the prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury, and
proved beyond a reasonable doubt.”348 In Alleyne v. United States, the
Court added that “ any fact that increases the mandatory minimum is an
‘element’ that must be submitted to the jury.”349 The relation of the
Apprendi/Alleyne doctrine to section 404 cases is an unsettled question.
First Step Act courts have taken three approaches to Apprendi/Alleyne.
Many have avoided the constitutional question(s). Some have decided
that the doctrine has no application to First Step Act cases. Others have
found that the Apprendi/Alleyne backdrop to the First Step Act permits
judicial flexibility regarding drug quantities.
First, some courts have sidestepped the Apprendi/Alleyne issue by
retaining operative drug quantities from uncontested PSRs or stipulated
plea agreements. For instance, the United States v. Broadway court
declined to resentence a defendant convicted of distributing more than
280 grams of crack350 because he had “filed no objections to the PreSentence Investigation Report, which indicated he was responsible for
487.82 grams of crack cocaine, and he stipulated to the report in his plea
agreement.”351 Accordingly, the resentencing court avoided the
constitutional issue and found that “Mr. Broadway’s sentencing range
[was] not changed by the Fair Step Act in that he was found to be
responsible for more than 280 grams of crack cocaine.”352
Second, other courts have analyzed Apprendi and Alleyne directly and
determined that they are not applicable to section 404 cases. The United
States v. Willis court explained that “a judge may not increase the
statutory penalty for crack cocaine under the First Step Act’s retroactivity
provisions[, so Apprendi/Alleyne] does not apply to a district court’s
decision under the First Step Act because ‘[d]eclining to reduce a
the quantity was calculated on the conservative or light side and that the evidence certainly would
have supported a more aggressive calculation in the presentence report.”). But some defendants
plead to a quantity.
348. Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 490 (2000).
349. Alleyne v. United States, 570 U.S. 99, 103 (2013).
350. United States v. Broadway, 437 F. Supp. 3d. 880, 886 (D. Colo. 2020) (“Mr. Broadway
argue[d] that the 487.82 grams of crack he was deemed accountable for by the Pre-Sentence Investigation Report was not determined beyond a reasonable doubt by a jury and, as such . . . the quantity cannot be used to ‘increase’ his statutory penalty . . . [or it] would violate the mandates of Apprendi v. New Jersey and Alleyne v. United States.”)
351. Id. at 887.
352. Id.
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sentence is not tantamount to an increase, nor does [a section 404]
proceeding implicate Defendant’s right to a jury trial.’”353 But while the
Willis court found that section 404 defendants are not entitled to
Apprendi/Alleyne protections, it did not address how the doctrine might
inform judicial fact-finding in a section 404 resentencing.
Third, some courts have found that the Apprendi/Alleyne backdrop to
the First Step Act permits judges to interrogate—and even depart from—
the quantity or quantities that drove the original sentence. In Mr.
Boulding’s case, the jury found beyond a reasonable doubt that he had
distributed fifty grams or more of cocaine base.354 Judge Jonker
originally found “by a probability” that Mr. Boulding had distributed 500
grams or more of crack cocaine,355 and as much as the 650.4 grams listed
in the PSR.356 At resentencing, Judge Jonker determined that he did not
have to adopt the highest quantity from the original sentencing as the sole
resentencing quantity. Instead, he considered both the “50 gram or more”
quantity found by the jury357 and the 650.4-gram amount submitted by
probation.358 The judge noted that the “only quantity found beyond a
reasonable doubt, or otherwise offered to support the factual basis for
conviction, was ‘50 grams or more’ of crack.”359 Still, he felt that the
353. United States v. Willis, 417 F. Supp. 3d 569, 588–89 (E.D. Pa. 2019) (citing United States
v. Nixon, No. 93-386-4, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 166359, at *8 (E.D. Pa. 2019)); see also United
States v. White, 413 F. Supp. 3d 15, 30–31 (D.D.C. 2019) (“[N]either FSA nor the First Step Act
operate to apply retroactively the Apprendi/Alleyne line of cases barring reliance on judicial factfinding to increase the statutory penalty for a crime beyond those facts found by a jury beyond a
reasonable doubt or admitted by the defendant (‘Apprendi/Alleyne rule’).”).
354. See United States v. Boulding, 379 F. Supp. 3d 646, 648 (W.D. Mich. 2019) (“The jury
found that the quantity of crack cocaine involved in the conspiracy beyond a reasonable doubt was
50 grams or more of crack cocaine, the highest quantity determination the verdict form asked them
to reach.”) (citation omitted).
355. Sentencing Transcript at 25, Boulding, No. 1:08-cr-00065 (“I have no problems finding on
the record that I saw by a probability that the quantities exceeded the 500-gram level of crack.”).
356. Id. at 8.
357. Boulding, 379 F. Supp. 3d at 656 n.6.
358. Id. at 655 (showing by table that the base level offense of 30 covers distribution of at least
280 grams but less than 840 grams).
359. Id. at 656 n.6 (“The defense invocation of Apprendi and Alleyne has genuine bite here.
Under the First Step Act, for any eligible defendant, the Court may choose to impose a reduced
sentence ‘as if’ the new thresholds of the Fair Sentencing Act were in effect at the time of the
original sentence. If those new thresholds had been in effect for Defendant Boulding, they would
only have permitted a Count 1 conviction under Section 841(b)(1)(B)(iii) because quantity is an
essential element of the (A)(iii) or (B)(iii) offense. The only quantity found beyond a reasonable
doubt, or otherwise offered to support the factual basis for conviction, was ‘50 grams or more’ of
crack. Alleyne and Apprendi have not been extended retroactively on collateral review. But that is
different than saying they have no significance in making the ‘as if’ sentencing decision called for
under the First Step Act.”); see also United States v. Williams, 402 F. Supp. 3d 442, 449 (N.D. Ill.
2019) (“So of course Alleyne does not apply retroactively to Williams’ case. But it does provide
another clue that Congress intended ‘covered offense’ to refer to the crime of conviction—not the
actual conduct determined by the judge at sentencing.”) (citations omitted).
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650.4-gram amount was pertinent to the offense conduct that he had to
consider at resentencing.360 Using both figures, Judge Jonker found
sufficient support for a new guidelines range of 292 months to 365
months,361 and a sentence reduction to 324 months.362 A number of
courts have similarly exercised their authority to depart from the drug
quantity that drove the original sentence.363
In Stanback, the court considered three drug quantity amounts: (1) a
jury finding of “50 grams or more” of cocaine base, (2) the Government’s
argument that a post-Fair-Sentencing-Act jury would have convicted the
defendant guilty on “280 grams or more” of cocaine base, and (3) the
original PSR estimate of 1.5 kilograms of cocaine base.364 The court held
that it was not permitted to “impose a [statutory] penalty based on the 1.5
kilograms of cocaine base referenced in the PSR.”365 Additionally, the
court would not impose a statutory penalty of ten years to life on the

360. Boulding, 379 F. Supp. 3d at 656 (positing that Mr. Boulding’s reduced sentence still reflected the severity of his offense conduct).
361. Id. at 655.
362. Id. at 655–57 (“[D]efendant Boulding’s guideline range calculation is reduced from life to
a term of 292 months to 365 months. This is because, first of all, his base offense level has been
reduced four levels under intervening guideline amendments. But in addition, it is because § 5G1.2
of the guidelines is no longer implicated. Previously that section mandated a guideline sentence of
life because the version of Section 841(b)(1)(A)(iii) in effect at the time of Defendant Boulding’s
sentence required it under the factual basis supporting the convictions. Applying the Fair Sentencing Act retroactively to the factual basis that supported the earlier convictions means that section
no longer controls Defendant Boulding’s sentence. Rather the factual basis for the Count 1 conviction based on the charges, the jury’s finding, and the prior Section 851 convictions in Count 1 would
only trigger the ten-year minimum and life term maximum in Section 841(b)(1)(B)(iii). To be sure,
the actual offense conduct quantities determined for sentencing may involve higher quantities—
even quantities high enough under the new thresholds. But the actual offense conduct quantities
only inform the Court’s discretion on whether to reduce an eligible defendant’s sentence; they do
not substitute for a required element of the factual basis for the offense of conviction whether established by jury verdict or guilty plea. . . . [D]efendant Boulding’s term of imprisonment is reduced to 324 months as to each of Counts 1 and 2, to be served concurrently.”) (emphasis omitted).
363. See United States v. Stanback, 377 F. Supp. 3d 618, 623 (W.D. Va. 2019) (“Under Alleyne,
this court is not free to ignore that finding and impose a penalty based on the 1.5 kilograms of
cocaine base referenced in the PSR. Thus, although Apprendi and Alleyne are not retroactively
applicable on collateral review, this court joins other courts in finding that their holdings are applicable in the context of the First Step Act.”).
364. Id. at 621–22 (“Because Stanback was found responsible for 1.5 kilograms on the conspiracy charge, which would make him subject to the 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1)(A) penalties, the government argues that he is not entitled to relief under the First Step Act.”).
365. Id. at 623 (“The jury in Stanback’s case found him guilty of conspiracy to distribute and
possess with intent to distribute 50 grams or more of cocaine base. ECF No. 214. Under Alleyne,
this court is not free to ignore that finding and impose a penalty based on the 1.5 kilograms of
cocaine base referenced in the PSR. Thus, although Apprendi and Alleyne are not retroactively
applicable on collateral review, this court joins other courts in finding that their holdings are applicable in the context of the First Step Act.”)
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speculated 280-gram amount.366 Rather, the court adopted the parties’
recommendation of a 188 to 235 months guidelines range and the
defendant’s argument that contemporary courts routinely depart below
the guidelines in instances of “minimal criminal history or to avoid
disparities with the other defendants in [that] case.”367 As the Stanback
Court explained, a well-informed Congress intended such judicial
discretion:
The government contends that nothing in the First Step Act suggests
that Congress intended to . . . change the manner of determining
quantity. In essence, the government is asking the court to . . . disregard
Alleyne when examining Stanback’s sentence. However, Congress,
when drafting the First Step Act in 2018, surely did not intend for courts
to disregard the last six years of Supreme Court federal sentencing
jurisprudence . . . .368

This interpretation squares with the view that resentencing judges must
make sufficient § 3553(a) findings369 in First Step Act cases. Thus,
though section 404 defendants are likely not entitled to Apprendi/Alleyne
protections, Congress probably intended that judges could exercise
discretion with respect to drug quantities in First Step Act resentencings.
As of late May 2020, no circuit court has ruled on judicial authority to
depart from the drug quantities that drove an original sentence. In fact,
the circuit courts have barely addressed the Apprendi/Alleyne issue.370 In
a nonbinding opinion, the Eleventh Circuit held that when a circuit court
made an Apprendi finding and upheld a drug quantity on direct appeal,
that quantity was unassailable under “law of the case” doctrine.371 But
366. Id. at 624 (“Thus, this court declines to assume that Stanback would have been charged
and convicted of possessing more than 280 grams of cocaine base if the Fair Sentencing Act had
been in effect at the time he was convicted.”); id. at 625 (explaining that the defendant had served
more than ten years without consideration of good time credit).
367. Id. at 625.
368. Stanback, 377 F. Supp. at 623; see also Alleyne v. United States, 570 U.S. 99, 103 (2013)
(“Any fact that, by law, increases the penalty for a crime is an ‘element’ that must be submitted to
the jury and found beyond a reasonable doubt.”).
369. See United States v. Smith, 959 F.3d 701, 704 (6th Cir. 2020) (“Ultimately, the district
court failed to provide a sufficiently compelling justification for maintaining a sentence that is now
twice the guideline range set by Congress. We are confident on remand that the district court can
determine whether, in its discretion, a sentence less than 20 years is appropriate after considering
the § 3553(a) factors with reference to the purposes of the First Step Act and Fair Sentencing Act.”).
370. A May 28, 2020, Westlaw search of “U.S. Courts of Appeals Cases” for the phrase “First
Step Act” followed by a “Search within results” for Apprendi yielded 15 cases. Several results did
not include Apprendi. Several more were direct appeals of recent sentences. Several cases sidestepped the Apprendi/Alleyne issue. E.g., United States v. Wyatt, 798 F. App’x 595, 596–97 (11th
Cir. 2020).
371. United States v. Brown, 803 F. App’x 322, 324 (11th Cir. 2020) (“Reading Brown’s brief
liberally, he argues that the district court contravened Apprendi when it denied his motion to reduce
by attributing a drug quantity to him without the amount being charged in an indictment or proved
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the issue in that case was a defendant’s right to Apprendi/Alleyne
protections, not a resentencing judge’s authority under section 404. As
this Article argues, Congress’s purpose in passing section 404 was to
grant authority to sitting judges to disturb the “law of the case” for eligible
defendants.
V. MODERN SAFEGUARDS AGAINST INDISCRIMINATE SENTENCING
Of course, appellate courts could adopt the foregoing reasoning and
still reject increased judicial authority on policy grounds. Theoretically,
enhanced authority could foster a return to indiscriminate sentencing.372
But, three modern safeguards preclude a return to 1970s-era sentencing:
(1) the Sentencing Guidelines, (2) § 3553, and (3) political attention.
First, credible evidence suggests that the Sentencing Guidelines still
exert a normalizing force on judges. Following Booker, the Guidelines
are advisory.373 Still, a departure from the Guidelines requires a written
justification and can serve as grounds for appeal.374 Recent racial bias
studies confirm that key sentencing trends remained constant pre- and
post-Booker. Starr and Rehavi’s analysis of “federal cases from arrest
through sentencing”375 found that the Sentencing Guidelines’
“harshness” was not blunted by Booker.376 Ulmer, Light, and Kramer
found similar results using a large sentence outcomes dataset collected
to a jury, but we held on direct appeal that no reversible error under Apprendi occurred in sentencing
him. That decision is the law of the case and bars Brown’s challenge to the denial of his fourth
motion to reduce.”) (citation omitted).
372. See 119 CONG. REC. 6060 (1973) (reporting that the U.S. Attorney’s Office for the Southern District of New York found that certain African American defendants received harsher sentences due to indiscriminate sentencing); see also Morris, supra note 94, at 9 (explaining how research has established that “state and federal sentencing systems are characterized by unjust
disparities.”).
373. Peugh v. United States, 569 U.S. 530, 537 (2013) (“We have indicated that ‘a district
court’s decision to vary from the advisory Guidelines may attract greatest respect when’ it is based
on the particular facts of a case. Overall, this system ‘requires a court to give respectful consideration to the Guidelines,’ but it ‘permits the court to tailor the sentence in light of other statutory
concerns as well.’”) (internal citations omitted); cf. Susan R. Klein, The Return of Federal Judicial
Discretion in Criminal Sentencing, 39 VAL. U. L. REV. 693, 734 (2005) (“For those who believe
that the primary purpose animating the Guidelines is uniformity, we probably already have sufficient date to conclude that Justice Breyer’s experiment is failing. For those who desire improved
uniformity over the pre-1984 days, yet long for some judicial discretion to account for unusual
cases, and especially for those who believe prosecutors possessed excessive power under the Guidelines, the experiment is somewhat of a success.”).
374. Crystal S. Yang, Free at Last? Judicial Discretion and Racial Disparities in Federal Sentencing, 44 J. LEGAL STUD. 75, 80 (2015) (“The government is permitted to appeal a sentence
resulting in a departure below the guidelines range, and the defendant can appeal an above-range
departure.”).
375. Sonja B. Starr & M. Marit Rehavi, Mandatory Sentencing and Racial Disparity: Assessing
the Role of Prosecutors and the Effects of Booker, 123 YALE L.J. 2, 24 (2013).
376. Id. at 2 (“[W]e find no evidence that racial disparity has increased since Booker, much less
because of Booker.”).
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by the U.S. Sentencing Commission.377
Not everyone agrees with these results.378 Yang’s analysis of nearly
400,000 federal prosecutions suggests that judges appointed after Booker
sentenced African American defendants more harshly than pre-Booker
appointees.379 But as Yang notes, her findings should “be interpreted
cautiously, as they apply predominantly to new Bush appointees.”380
Further, these newer judges might eventually regress to Sentencing
Guidelines norms. As Starr and Rehavi explain, judges typically conform
to the Guidelines to avoid open-ended sentencing, criticism, or reversal,
or because they believe that the Guidelines work to reduce disparity.381
For now, then, it appears that the Sentencing Guidelines moderate judicial
indeterminacy and contribute to some consistency among judges. So too
does § 3553.382
Second, § 3553 requires judges to consider sentence typicality. Under
subsection (a)(6), judges must consider “the need to avoid unwarranted
sentence disparities among defendants with similar records who have
been found guilty of similar conduct.”383 “[T]he purpose of § 3553(a)(6)
377. Jeffrey T. Ulmer, Michael T. Light, & John H. Kramer, Racial Disparity in the Wake of
the Booker/Fanfare Decision: An Alternative Analysis to the USSC’s 2010 Report, 10
CRIMINOLOGY & PUB. POL’Y 1077, 1108 (2011) (“The USSC 2010 report points to greater sentence-length disparity affecting Black males in the post-Booker/Gall periods . . . . However, based
on our differing results using alternative procedures . . . we question the notion that Booker and
Gall have caused increases in race/ethnic and gender sentence-length disparity compared with the
full range of years when the Guidelines were mandatory.”).
378. Id.; see also Yang, supra note 374, at 75 (explaining that black defendants received harsher
sentences after Booker in part due to “increased judicial discretion”).
379. See Yang, supra note 374, at 75 (“Using data on the universe of federal defendants, I find
that black defendants received 2 months more in prison compared with their white counterparts
after Booker, a 4 percent increase in average sentence length. To identify the sources of racial
disparities, I construct a data set linking judges to defendants. Exploiting the random assignment
of cases to judges, I find that racial disparities after Booker were greater among judges appointed
after Booker, which suggests acculturation to the guidelines by judges with experience sentencing
under a mandatory-guidelines regime.”); but see also Joshua B. Fischman & Max M. Schanzenbach, Racial Disparities Under the Federal Sentencing Guidelines: The Role of Judicial Discretion
and Mandatory Minimums, 9 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 729, 729 (2012) (“[J]udicial discretion
does not contribute to, and may in fact mitigate, racial disparities in Guidelines sentencing.”).
380. Yang, supra note 374, at 108. But note similar cautions in research that reaches the
opposite conclusion; see Starr & Rehavi, supra note 375, at 70 (“This directly contravenes the
conclusion implied by the Sentencing Commission’s report. However, the contrary conclusion is
only tentative. There is again considerable noise in the sentencing data, and the estimate is only
significant in two of the specifications.”).
381. Starr & Rehavi, supra note 375, at 15 (“Federal judges are still required to calculate the
Guidelines sentencing range, and, although they are then free to depart from it, they usually do not.
There are many possible reasons for this continued conformity: federal judges might believe that
the Guidelines meet the goal of reducing disparity, wish to avoid open-ended, subjective sentencing
assessments, seek insulation from criticism or reversal, or simply treat the Guidelines as an
‘anchor.’”).
382. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553 (explaining how the guidelines apply to imposing a sentence).
383. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(6).
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is to promote national uniformity in the sentences imposed by federal
courts.”384 A court’s failure to consider typical or comparable federal
sentences can be grounds for appeal, particularly when a defendant has
argued that his or her sentence departs from federal sentencing norms.385
Of course, § 3553 also urges judges to consider “the nature and
circumstances of the offense and the history and characteristics of the
defendant.”386 This case-by-case approach can contribute to a judicial
myopathy at odds with inter-defendant or interdistrict uniformity.387
Even so, § 3553’s factors facilitate both judicial introspection and
defense appeals. As a result, § 3553 mitigates against luck-of-the draw
sentencing.
Third, federal punishment is once again a topic of national
conversation. The First Step Act demonstrates political attention to this
issue, and further legislation is likely.388 While policymaker and public
interest should not influence sentencing outcomes, judges understand that
their decisions are being scrutinized. This attention is simply one more
reason that a return to indiscriminate sentencing is unlikely.
Accordingly, there is no convincing policy rationale for denying
judges the authority conferred by Congress through the First Step Act.

384. United States v. Begin, 696 F.3d 405, 412 (3d Cir. 2012); cf. Pepper v. United States, 562
U.S. 476, 504 (2011) (“Finally, we note that §§ 3553(a)(5) and (a)(6) describe only two of the seven
sentencing factors that courts must consider in imposing sentence.”).
385. Begin, 696 F.3d at 414 (2-1 decision to vacate and remand because the trial court “did not
acknowledge that [the defendant] had also made a federal-federal disparity argument. The Court
asked no questions during defense counsel’s oral argument in favor of downward variance on this
ground and made no comments about the issue following that presentation . . . . [and] we have held
that ‘a district court’s failure to analyze § 3553(a)(6) may constitute reversible procedural error,
even where . . . the court engages in thorough and thoughtful analysis of several other sentencing
factors.’” (quoting United States v. Merced, 603 F.3d 203, 224 (3d Cir. 2010))).
386. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(1).
387. Andrew Manuel Crespo, Systemic Facts: Toward Institutional Awareness in Criminal
Courts, 129 HARV. L. REV. 2049, 2051, 2100 (2015) (“On the contrary, case-by-case adjudication
naturally focuses judicial attention on the case-specific details of individual claims, presented by
individual litigants, one case at a time. The very process of constitutional criminal adjudication, in
other words, inculcates in criminal courts a transactional myopia that frustrates their capacity to
recognize, understand, and engage the broader institutional dynamics of the criminal justice system . . . . Contemporary criminal courts are major custodians of systemic facts. If those facts are
leveraged properly, they can enhance not only judges’ institutional awareness and comprehension
of institutional law enforcement practices, but also their ability to regulate and oversee such practices at a systemic level.”).
388. 164 CONG. REC. S7756 (daily ed. Dec. 18, 2018) (statement of Sen. Nelson) (“These rigid
sentences that do not fit the crimes ought to be turned around, and that is exactly what this legislation does. If we don’t start this first step of turning it around, it will be so wasteful, so unfair, so
costly. It is not how our criminal justice system was intended to work.”); id. at S7776 (statement of
Sen. Cardin) (“Let us take this first step to reform our broken criminal justice system by passing
this legislation during this session, and let us pledge to work together to make further improvements
in the new Congress.”).
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CONCLUSION
Judge Jonker sentenced Walter Boulding to life in prison less than two
years after taking the bench.389 At the time, the judge expressed
frustration with Congress for depriving him of the discretion to impose a
lengthy sentence short of life imprisonment.390 More than a decade
passed before Congress restored Judge Jonker’s authority.391
Less than six months into the First Step Act, Judge Jonker reconsidered
Mr. Boulding’s sentence and reduced his term of imprisonment to 324
months.392 Under that reduced sentence, Mr. Boulding will be released in
his 50s.393 Judge Jonker explained that the new sentence achieved
balance under § 3553:
This sentence reflects the significant custodial sentence that the
Court stated it would still have applied at the original sentencing, given
the 3553 factors. As the Court at that time noted, Defendant Boulding
was not engaged in a simple or light distribution scheme. Indeed, the
drug conspiracy was significant, and Defendant Boulding had a
leadership role in that conspiracy . . . . The trial record also included
testimony from multiple people whose lives were hurt by the activity
that Defendant Boulding led.
But as the Court stated then, and reiterates now, a sentence of life
imprisonment is too much punishment. It is overwhelming on the facts
of this case, and indeed undermines some of the § 3553 factors. The
First Step Act now permits the Court to impose a reduced sentence that,
in the Court’s mind, is the more consistent outcome after a consideration of all the 3553 factors.394

Section 3553 instructs sentencing judges to “impose a sentence
sufficient, but not greater than necessary . . . to reflect the seriousness of
the offense, to promote respect for the law, and to provide just
punishment.”395 That instruction carries a heavy burden and requires
immense care and craft.
Legislative history suggests that the First Step Act permits judges to
389. Sentencing Transcript, United States v. Boulding, No. 08-cr-00065 (W.D. Mich. 2009).
390. Id. at 3 (“You know, and in the Boulding case, in some senses with the congressional
mandate of mandatory life in this situation, in some sense it’s an easy sentencing hearing . . . . On
the other hand, in the more fundamental way, it’s a very difficult sentencing hearing for me, because
life in prison is not the sentence I would impose on Mr. Boulding if I had the full discretion that I
normally have in sentencing.”).
391. See First Step Act of 2018, Pub. L. No. 115-391, § 404(b), 132 Stat. 5222.
392. Opinion & Order at 16, United States v. Boulding, No. 08-cr-00065 (W.D. Mich. filed
May 16, 2019).
393. Id. at 1 (explaining that Mr. Boulding was sentenced in 2009, at the age of 29). In other
words, 324 months is 27 years. If Mr. Boulding serves the entire term, he will be released in 2036,
at the age of 56. With good conduct credit, he could be released several years before that.
394. United States v. Boulding, 379 F. Supp. 3d 646, 657 (W.D. Mich. 2019).
395. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a).
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exercise such discretion to remedy unjust sentences. 396 Accordingly,
appellate courts should construe judicial authority under the First Step
Act as the power to impose just punishment for eligible defendants based
upon the judge’s reasoned view of the record.397
Though most circuits have adopted categorical eligibility for First Step
Act relief, they have yet to determine the reach of judicial authority over
complex but common issues such as judge-determined drug quantities
and concurrent non-crack convictions. Further, most circuits have not
resolved whether judges may acknowledge evolving precedent and
defendant rehabilitation. As a result, the law of the First Step Act remains
in disarray. This disorder not only leaves long-serving defendants in
limbo, it threatens to undermine future efforts at scaffolded criminal
justice reform. As demonstrated throughout this Article, a broad reading
of the First Step Act is historically and legally correct. Circuit courts
should interpret the law as the broad reform Congress intended.

396. On the need for adequate judicial discretion in First Step Act resentencing, see 164 CONG.
REC. S7748 (daily ed. Dec. 18, 2018) (statement of Sen. Klobuchar); id. at S7756 (statement of
Sen. Nelson); id. at S7762 (statement of Sen. Booker); see also United States v. Boulding, 379 F.
Supp. 3d 646, 653–54 (W.D. Mich. 2019) (discussing how the Act “emphasizes that any reduction
in sentence is in the reviewing court’s discretion”).
397. See United States v. Beamus, 943 F.3d 789, 792 (6th Cir. 2019) (“That Beamus is eligible
for resentencing does not mean he is entitled to it. The First Step Act ultimately leaves the choice
whether to resentence to the district court’s sound discretion. In exercising that discretion, a judge
may take stock of several considerations, among them the criminal history contained in the presentence report. How do these considerations play out for Beamus? That’s a question only the district
court can answer. We reverse and remand to give it the opportunity to do so.”) (internal citations
omitted); United States v. Venable, 943 F.3d 187, 194–95 (4th Cir. 2019) (“We emphasize that our
holding today is limited to the issue of a district court’s authority to resentence a defendant serving
a term of imprisonment for revocation of supervised release whose original, underlying conviction
was for a ‘covered offense.’ . . . For the reasons discussed above, we hold that the district court
erred in concluding the First Step Act did not authorize it to provide relief to Venable because he
had finished serving his original term of imprisonment and was currently serving a term of imprisonment for revocation of supervised release.”) (emphasizing original).

